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DIGEST
This Issue Summary examines the financing of political campaigns in California over the
past twenty years. The materials focus primarily upon state legislative elections which
provide a large sample size and allow for generalizations across election cycles. Data
from initiative campaigns and statewide elections are used to illustrate key points. This
research was requested by Assembly Member Gwen Moore.
There are four main variables of a campaign finance system: contribution limits, spending
limits, public funding, and campaign finance disclosure. The paper is organized by these
variables into seven component sections:

•

Contributions and Contribution Limits: This section examines fundraising patterns for
political campaigns in California, provides data on the sources of contributions,
suggests implications of current fundraising patterns, and evaluates the consequences
ofvarious contribution limitations.

• Expenditures and Spending Limits: This discussion analyzes the role of spending in
California political campaigns, explores the cost of state legislative campaigns,
examines the implications of current campaign spending practices, and assesses the
consequences of expenditure limitations.
•

Public Financing: This section discusses the use of public funds for political
campaigns, outlines the key components of public funding systems, and summarizes
the debate over public financing.

•

Campaign Finance Disclosure: Finally, the paper explores the disclosure of campaign
information in California, provides a brief history of disclosure provisions, and
analyzes their effectiveness.

•

Campaign Finance Provisions in Selected Jurisdictions: These charts summarize
campaign finance provisions in the United States and in several local jurisdictions,
covering a wide spectrum of alternative campaign finance schemes.

•

Options: This section explores components of each of the above four variables,
provides a range of alternatives for each, and examines some implications of
implementing each option.

•

Appendices: The appendices provide detailed background information on campaign
finance including: a history of reform efforts in California; a description of current
California campaign finance reform legislation; and a series of historical charts
detailing the raising and spending of money in California political campaigns.

INTRODUCTION
Elections are at the heart of representative government. Not only do they provide the
formal means for transferring authority from the general populace to a small number of
elected representatives, they provide a direct means for holding those representatives
accountable. The legitimacy of representative institutions, then, depends in part on the
legitimacy of the elections process. Furthermore, the importance of elections in California
is increased by the integral role which the initiative process plays in public policy. 1
Political campaigns serve a valuable role in the electoral process because candidates and
other concerned individuals must be able to reach voters to communicate their messages
and advocate for their candidacy or their cause. This communication is expensive and
requires money, leading one scholar to assert, "campaign expenditures must be recognized
as vital to the American way of choosing public officials. The expenditures are inherently
neither good nor bad, neither high nor low. They are simply necessary. "2 While some
democracies provide public funds to finance political campaigns, private contributions
provide the only source of funds for California elections.
A number of studies conducted during the past two decades support the assertion that
campaign spending plays a critical role in legislative elections and initiative campaigns. 3
This is not to say that the candidate who raises the most money will necessarily win.
Other factors such as partisan affiliation, incumbency status, name recognition, ballot
designation, and the impact of free media might have substantial effects on election results.
Nonetheless, the ability to raise money is a threshold characteristic for serious challengers.
It is important to point out that recent political reforms, such as the implementation of
term limits on elected officials, may have a profound impact on the nature of political
campaigns and the inherent advantages of incumbency. However, these effects may not be
apparent for a number ofyears.
Former Vice-President Hubert Humphrey once described political fundraising as a
"curse ... the most disgusting, demeaning, disenchanting, debilitating experience of a
politician's life. "4 While the process of raising money may be distasteful, candidates
recognize that spending substantial sums of money makes them more competitive. Just to
become viable, candidates must be willing to raise large amounts of money. The ability to
stockpile huge war chests of campaign funds helps incumbents to ward off potentially
troublesome challengers.
California state legislative candidates raised and spent approximately $72 million during
the 1991-1992 election cycle. Ballot measure committees raised and spent an additional
$34 million during the 1992 elections. Spending in 1994 should well surpass this mark, as

1 Cook

and Simmons, 1994.
1962.
3 See Jacobson; Gierzynski and Breaux; Owens and Wade; Magleby; and Lowenstein.
4 New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, 1989.
2 Heard,
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the election also includes statewide races and a number of high-profile initiative
campatgns.
Campaign-finance reform has been a contentious political issue in California since it first
attracted public attention after the Watergate scandal. Despite numerous legislative
proposals and citizen-sponsored initiatives designed to regulate the flow of money into
political campaigns (See Appendix A), reform remains illusory. A series of highly
publicized political scandals and state legislative political corruption trials involving
campaign and personal payments have resulted in a measurable loss of public confidence in
state political institutions, s further magnifying a need for reform. However, despite well
documented public dissatisfaction with the current system of financing political
campaigns, 6 there is neither consensus on whether campaign financing should be reformed,
not how it should be reformed if it is. First Amendment protections on freedom of speech
have been interpreted by the courts to include specific political activities, including raising
and spending money for political office, thereby limiting public policy alternatives. In
general, states have failed to develop clear or consistent standards for regulating campaign
finance, providing for significant variation as detailed in Chart 32 (Page 48).
Campaign finance reaches into the heart of the relationships between elected officials and
their constituents, other citizens, political parties, interest groups, and other elected
officials. The current system benefits some political actors and disadvantages others--it is
not neutral, nor are alternative fundraising mechanisms. Thus, even slight alterations may
have significant repercussions throughout the political system. Reforms would profoundly
affect representative and power relationships. For example, while an objective of reform
may be to encourage political participation by removing "big money" from the political
system, this may diminish the amount of information available to citizens, and the quality
of political dialogue, both of which are required to make informed electoral decisions.
Insufficient political communication may discourage political participation, particularly
among some electoral groups.
Some commentators believe there is a fundamental tension between American egalitarian
democratic ideals (as expressed in "one person, one vote,") and an unequal distribution of
economic resources. This tension is exacerbated by the process of raising and spending
private money for election to public office. Reformers have suggested mechanisms to
"level the playing field" and strike a balance between these contending systems:
contribution limits, expenditure limits, public financing, and disclosure requirements.
Since the debate over campaign finance is fueled by fundamental values, alternatives are
hotly contested and involve considerable trade-offs .

.s The Field Institute,
6

1992.
Center for Law in the Public Interest. 1992.
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RAISING MONEY: CONTRIBUTIONS AND CONTRIBUTION LIMITS
Who Contributes?

When California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 9 in June 1974, they approved
the most comprehensive campaign finance disclosure provisions in United States history.
The Political Reform Act required all campaign committees receiving or spending $500 or
more dollars to file a statement of organization with the Secretary of State and to file a
series of reports detailing their financial activities. Candidates were required to complete
periodic campaign disclosure reports identifying all contributors of $50 or more and each
person or corporation to whom an expenditure of $50 or more was made. The measure
was hailed at the time of its passage as a mechanism for ensuring that "public business (is)
conducted openly and honestly-in public for all to see. "7
However, twenty years later, it is clear that the disclosure provisions do not provide a
timely and accurate reporting of campaign data. The last comprehensive study on the
source of campaign contributions was conducted in 1985. Neither the Secretary of State
nor the Fair Political Practices Commission issues comprehensive campaign finance
reports (in part due to budget constraints). Without these reports, quantifying or even
identifying the source of political contributions is a time-consuming task. One must go to
the Secretary of State's office in Sacramento and request each of the individual candidate
reports for the desired election cycle. These reports often exceed one hundred pages for
statewide candidates and list thousands of entries without summarizing the data by source.
Frequently, pages are missing or numbers do not add up, with no manageable way of
checking the figures. So while the data are technically available to the public, the
information is not compiled in a comprehensive manner for public consumption. As a
practical matter, therefore, it is not useful.
This report attempts to fill this information void by providing a comprehensive evaluation
of the sources of campaign contributions. We coded over 81,000 separate contributions
in amounts above $100 according to the name ofthe contributor and classified by source
as individuals; political action committees, corporations and labor unions; partisan sources;
and family sources•. We grouped PACs, corporations, and labor unions together for the
purpose of data analysis in order to analyze the contribution patterns of "special interests."
Disaggregating the data would not further delineate the source of contributions because
corporations and labor unions often establish PACs to distribute money, as well as
contributing directly to candidates and ballot measure committees from the organization.
"Party and Transfers" includes political party contributions, transfer contributions from
other candidates, and legislative-caucus contributions. Although there may be connections
between some organizations and individuals, the data do not disclose that information.

7 California

Ballot Pamphlet. Primary Election 1974.
• Capitol Weekly publishes contribution data from reports filed with the Secretary of State and is the
source of this information.
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California Legislative Contributions: Private organizations contributed nearly 2/3 of the
contributions over $100 raised by California legislative candidates during the 1991-1992
election cycle, while individuals gave just 17 percent.
·

Chart 1

Source of Contributions of $100 or More:
California Legislative Candidates 1991-1992
7%

•

Individuals

IDI PACs. Business, and Labor

0

Party and Transfers

0

Family

61%

Source: California Research Bureau

The source of contributions varied somewhat between the California State Assembly and
the State Senate.

Chart 2

Source of Contributions of $100 or More:
By Legislative Seat Sought 1991-92
70%
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50%
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Source: California Research Bureau
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Differences between the chambers may be partially explained by several factors:
•

•
•

There are fewer Senators (40) than Assembly Members (80), giving each Senator's
vote relatively more weight. PACs, business, and labor may maximize their influence
by contributing to Senators at a higher rate. In the 1992 election 23 Senate
incumbents received $14 million and 58 Assembly incumbents received
proportionately less, $23 million, from these sources.
Due to tight financial constraints, political parties and party leaders in the Legislature
tend to direct their contributions to the most competitive races. During the 1991-92
cycle, Assembly races were the most competitive elections.
Several candidates for the Senate contributed large amounts of personal funds to their
own campaigns.

Another important difference between the two chambers has to do with the vast
fundraising difference between incumbents and non-incumbents. Although there were
more than three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking office, incumbents
outraised non-incumbents by $54 million to $25 million in 1991-92. Assembly incumbents
raised $34 million while Assembly non-incumbents raised $23 million. Senate incumbents
raised $20 million while Senate non-incumbents raised just $2 million.
Chart 3 shows the difference between the two chambers in the degree to which
incumbents outraised their opponents. In order to account for the large number of noncompetitive challengers, this ratio is based on the amount of money raised by incumbents
divided by the amount raised by their highest-raising challenger. Unopposed incumbents
and incumbents whose opponents did not raise money are not included in this figure.
Chart 3

Incumbency Advanta re by Chamber 1991-928
Assembly
Senate

Average Amount
Raised by Incumbents

Average Amount
Raised by Challengers

$335,887
$405,163

$130,677
$119,502

Incumbency
Advantage
2.7 to 1
3.4 to 1

The competitiveness of elections appears to be a key variable related to this incumbency
fundraising advantage. Assembly elections were typically more competitive than Senate
elections during the 1991-92 election cycle. However, even when controlling for the
degree of competition, Senate incumbents enjoyed a wider fundraising advantage than
their Assembly colleagues. Including only highly competitive elections (those in which
the final vote margin was within ten percentage points) Senate incumbents outspent their
highest-raising opponents by 2.6 to 1. Assembly incumbents outspent their opponents by
1.6 to 1.
The relative contributions of funding sources have varied over the last twelve years.
8

California Secretary of State and California Research Bureau.
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Chart 4

Source of Contributions of $100 or More:
All State Legislative Candidates 1980-1992
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Source: California Research Bureau and California Commission on Campaign Financing (1985)

As Chart 4 demonstrates, the significance of partisan money in state legislative races is

declining. Intra-party contributions reached their height (31 percent) in 1982. Just a
decade later that proportion has fallen to 15 percent. Conversely, contributions from
PACs, corporations, and labor unions have increased proportionally during the same
period. This finding appears to support a Council of State Governments study which
attributes the national rise ofPACs to a general decline in the power of political parties. 9
Contributions from individuals (ranging from 13 percent to 17 percent) have shown the
most consistency. Family contributions, including personal contributions to a candidate's
own campaign, are becoming an increasingly important source of campaign funds. From
1980 to 1992, the share of total contributions from families increased to nearly 10 percent.
Small contributions of less than $100 from all sources comprised less than 5 percent of all
contributions during the period surveyed. 10
Initiative Contributions: Chart 5 shows that PAC, corporate, and labor contributions

dominate initiative campaigns. Individual contributions to ballot measure committees
comprised just 3 percent of all money raised to support or oppose 1992 propositions. In
contrast, PACs, business, and labor accounted for 82 percent of all funds raised. Party
contributions and transfers (including political party contributions and contributions from
elected officeholders) comprised 15 percent.

9 Chi, "State Campaign Finance Reform: Options for the Future," 1993.
10 Ruth Holton, testimony to Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment.
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Chart 5

Source of Contributions of $100 or More:
Ballot Measure Committees 1992
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Source: California Research Bureau

In contrast, a study of the highest spending initiative campaigns found that PACs,
business, and labor supply almost 90 percent of the money used to support or oppose
these ballot measures.l1
Chart 6

Source of Contributions of $100 or More:
18 Highest-Spending Initiative Campaigns (1912-1992)

•

PACs. Business, and Labor

•

lndivic11als

0

Party and Transfers

UD Officeholders

Source: California Commission on Campaign Financing Democracy by Initiative

11 Ibid.
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Charts 5 and 6 indicate that there is significant variation in the sources of contributions to
ballot measure committees in 1992 and the highest spending initiative campaigns. This is
primarily due to the content of the initiatives under consideration. For example, in 1992,
elected officials played a more expansive role in financing initiative campaigns than is the
norm. A large proportion ofthe $4.6 million contributed by state officeholders in 1992
was to committees supporting or opposing Proposition 165, the Welfare and State Budget
Initiative. Conversely, the highest-spending initiative campaigns typically involve issues
critical to the business community. For example, in 1988, $80 million was spent to
conduct campaigns favoring or opposing five insurance initiatives, the vast majority of
which was contributed by the insurance industry, trial lawyers, and other political action
committees and corporations. 12 Most likely, these initiatives would have garnered similar
financial support or opposition regardless of the election year.

Political Action Committees, Corporations, and Labor
There are 1,640 PACs registered with the California Secretary of State and over 4,210
federal PACs recognized by the Federal Elections Commission. Their emergence is a
relatively new phenomenon. PACs originated in the labor union movement of the 1940's
in response to Congressional legislation which prohibited labor unions from spending
organizational assets for political activities. (Corporations were prohibited from
contributing corporate assets by legislation enacted earlier in the century. 13 ) The Congress
oflndustrial Organizations created the "first American PAC" as a separate, segregated
fund. 14 This organization, termed "The Political Action Committee" by the CIO, was
designed to accept voluntary contributions and expend funds to further the union's
political agenda.
Other PACs were created in the ensuing years, but real growth occurred in response to a
series of federal reforms in the 1970's. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974
(FECA) was designed, in part, to restrict the role of large "fat cat" individual contributors
in federal elections. The Act prohibited individuals from contributing in excess of$1,000
per candidate per election, up to an aggregate of$25,000 per calendar year. Multicandidate political committees (organizations receiving contributions from a number of
diverse sources and contributing to more than one candidate) faced less restrictive
regulations: contribution limits of $5,000 per candidate per election and no aggregate
contribution limit. FECA also overturned a Hatch Act provision which prohibited
corporations and labor unions with federal contracts from creating PACs. These
provisions fueled the growth ofPACs.
Shortly thereafter, the United States Supreme Court held in Buckley v. Valeo that FECA's
limitations on independent expenditures violated First Amendment protections. 15 The
ruling prohibited restrictions on the ability of individuals or committees to independently
12 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1992.
13

Sorauf, 1990.

14

Ibid.
Buckley v. Va/eo, 1976.
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CRB-IS-006

July, 1994

Page 9 of61

promote candidates or advocate positions. This further enhanced the potential power of
PACs because they are typically the only non-party org~tions sufficiently organized to
conduct independent expenditure campaigns. In 1975 the Federal Elections Commission
opined that Sun Oil's corporate PAC could use corporate funds to solicit voluntary
contributions from employees. 16 This decision cleared the way for a variety of fundraising
activities and encouraged labor unions and corporations to create PACs to serve as their
political advocacy arms. As Frank Sorauf notes, "virtually every major change in the
regulation of campaign finance that Congress enacted in the 1970's spurred the growth of
PACs."t 7
PACs tend to cluster around either ideological or economic interests.
•

•

Ideological P ACs are generally organized around either broad-based philosophical
beliefs or single policy issues. They typically contribute to candidates sympathetic to
their positions, regardless of party affiliation or incumbency status. The National Rifle
Association and Handgun Control PAC are examples of ideological committees.
Economic PACs include corporate, labor union, and professional and trade association
committees. Examples include Phillip Morris PAC, AFL-CIO PACs, and the
California Medical Association PAC. They have a different pattern of contributions.
A recent study found that economic PACs are primarily concerned with gaining access
to the political process, and therefore tend to favor incumbents over non-incumbents
regardless of ideology. 18 Unlike ideological PACs, which often support a single
candidate in open seat contests, economic PACs prefer to hedge their bets. They
contribute to each of the major candidates in highly competitive open seat elections to
ensure that they have supported the eventual winner. Further, an incumbent's voting
record is the key factor that PACs consider in determining how much to contribute
and to which candidates. 19

Chart 7 shows that state legislative incumbents received almost twice as much of their
funds from P ACs, business, and labor than did non-incumbents during the 1991-92
election cycle (71 percent to 38 percent). While challengers received a plurality of their
funds from political action committees, individual and party contributions, partisan
transfers, and personal and fanuly contributions comprised a significant portion of their
funds.

16
17

Alexander, 1992.
Sorauf, 1990.
18 King and Robin, 1989.
19 Ibid.
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Chart 7

Sources of Contributions of $100 or More:
Non-Incumbents 1991-92

Party and Transfers
23%

PACs, Business, and
Labor38%

Incumbents 1991-92
Party and Transfers
12%

Family 2%

PACs, Busir-, and
Labor71%

Source: California Research Bureau

According to a California Common Cause report, the ten largest contributors to state
legislative candidates accounted for a combined ten percent of the total money raised
during the 1991-92 state legislative election cycle ($7.7 million). Nine of these ten are
"economic" PACs: California Medical Association PAC, California Correctional Peace
Officer Association PAC, California Teachers Association PAC, California Trial Lawyers'
PAC, California Real Estate PAC, Association of California Insurance Companies' PAC,
Atlantic Richfield Company PAC, California Dental Association PAC, and California
Optometric Association PAC. Allied Business PAC, the ninth-largest contributor, is an
CRB-IS-006
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ideological PAC. Incumbents received 59 percent ofthese contributions, while open seat
candidates received 31 percent and challengers 10 percent. 20 In contrast, incumbents
received 92 percent of the money contributed by the top ten contributors in 1990. 21 The
difference between the two election years might have been due to the large number of
open Assembly seats (24) in 1992.
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking
election in 1992, Chart 8 indicates that incumbents received 80 percent of the
contributions from PACs, corporations, and labor unions. 22
Chart 8

PAC, Corporate, and Labor Contributions to
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92

mlnrumberts (82)
•

Non-Incumbents (251)

Source: California Research Bureau

The existence of highly-contested open-seat elections appears to affect the proportion of
political action committee, corporate, and labor union contributions received by nonincumbents and incumbents. Chart 9 shows that Assembly non-incumbents received a
greater share of these contributions than Senate non-incumbents. On average, incumbents
received 97 percent ofthe Senate contributions from these sources in 1991-92. 23 There
were no open-seat Senate elections. In contrast, there were 24 open Assembly seats
incumbents garnered 91 percent of the PAC, corporate, and labor contributions to state
Assembly candidates.

California Common Cause Deep Pockets. 1993.
California Common Cause, 1992.
See Appendix G for total contributions to California State Legislative candidates by source and
incumbency status for 1991-92.
23 The data used for Chart 9 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate.

20

21
22
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Chart 9

PAC, Corporate, and Labor Contributions to
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992
Senate
Assembly

Some analysts argue that the reliance of legislative candidates on PAC, corporate, and
labor contributions might compel these candidates to cultivate a "twin constituency," an
electoral constituency and a financial one. The paradox is that candidates need to secure
the votes of their constituents to be elected, yet they seek money from outside their
district to encourage that support. The California Commission on Campaign Financing
found in 1985 that 92 percent of all contributions to state legislative candidates originated
outside the legislators' districts. Dual constituencies may lead to a more complicated
representative relationship between an elected official and the general public. "The two
constituencies do not always have the same preferences on issues of public policy ...
conflicting pressures in both the campaign and in public office follow. "24
This phenomenon is a relatively new one. For much of American democratic history,
powerful political parties composed of broad coalitions of multiple cross-cutting interests
predominated and prevented this overlapping. "The electoral and resource constituencies
were congruent. Both were rooted in the localism of the geographically defined voting
constituency and in the matching units of party organization. "2S However, the influence of
political parties on legislative races is on the decline, as evidenced by declining
percentages of campaign contributions (Chart 4). Still, the development of dual
constituencies is not inherently problematic. Studies of Congressional behavior show that
"personal philosophy, party loyalty, and an aversion to offending voters are more
influential factors than campaign contributions in determining positions taken by members
of Congress. "26 A recent study of the California Legislature found that "for both business
and labor interests, neither the number nor the monetary amount of campaign
contributions to incumbents are found to have a major influence on legislative roll call
voting. "27 However, the study notes that there may be critical issues for which a
contributor's specific interest assumes greater importance than a dispersed district interest.
24

Sorauf, 1990.

25 Ibid.
26 Jacobson. 1978.
27 Dow and Endersby, 1994.
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Individuals

Individuals typically give the largest proportion of contributions in state legislative
elections throughout the United States. In addition, candidates for Congress raised
between 60 and 70 percent of their funds from individuals throughout the past decade. In
California, however, individual contributors play a less prevalent role than in other states
or for all of Congress. During the 1991-92 election cycle, individual contributions
comprised just 17 percent of the total amount raised by state legislative candidates.
Individuals may contribute money because of ideological or public-policy reasons, the
perceived opportunity to improve their financial situation, or for social reasons. For
example, "many people donate money to political campaigns simply because they are
asked to make a contribution. Other individuals contribute to campaigns out of a sense of
civic duty or because they sympathize with a particular candidate or cause that is being
advocated. "28 While individuals contribute for a variety of reasons, a recent study found
that these individuals have much in common with each other. Typical campaign
contributors are "a highly elite politicized stratum of the electorate (for whom) political
contribution is a repetitive and perhaps cumulative behavior. "29
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking
election in 1992, incumbents received 58 percent of contributions from individuals.
Chart 10

Individual Contributions to
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92

42%

mlncumberts (82)
• Non-Incumbents (251)
58%

Source: California Research Bureau

28
29

Sorauf, 1992.
Jones and Hopkins, 1985.
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Disaggregating the data yields a different result for the Senate and Assembly. Once again,
highly competitive open-seat races appear to be a key variable. Non-incumbents received
15 percent ofthe Senate individual contributions in 1991-92, while non-incumbents
received 21 percent of Assembly individual contributions. 30
Chart 11

Individual Contributions to State Legislative Candidates
per Candidate 1991-1992
Senate
Assembly
...... C' . . . .

-These figures may understate the role of individual contributions. Some individuals do not
contribute directly to candidates because they feel that their contributions would just be a
small drop in a very large bucket. 31 Instead, they pool their money, and their political
influence, by contributing to political parties, PACs, or trade associations and labor
unions, who "bundle" these contributions and pass them on in larger sums to candidates.
So while direct individual contributions comprised just 17 percent of state legislative
campaign contributions in 1991-92, individuals actually played a more significant role by
contributing to political parties, PACs, and other committees.
Political Party Contributions and Transfers

Party organizations were the third largest source of state legislative campaign funds in
1991-92 ( 15 percent). These include direct political-party contributions, transfer
contributions from other candidates or officeholders, and legislative-caucus contributions.
While the proportion of contributions from these sources is relatively small, party
contributions can have an important impact on the outcomes of targeted campaigns.
Rather than distributing small sums to a large number of candidates, partisan sources
typically target a small number of particularly close races and inject large sums of money
at critical points in the election. The average partisan contribution in 1992 was in excess
of $17,000. Also, political parties contribute more to political campaigns than the $7
million of direct contributions reported by candidates in 1992. Much of this is in the form
of "soft money" expenditures which candidates do not report. "Soft money" expenditures
include voter registration campaigns, get out the vote efforts, and other activities designed
. 30

The data used for Chart 11 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate.
31 Jacobson. 1980.
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to assist targeted candidates while simultaneously promoting the party. Since "soft
money" is not subject to the same disclosure requirements as direct contributions, it is
difficult to know whether parties have increased these activities as their share of direct
contributions has waned.
The California Commission on Campaign Financing found that officeholder transfers and
legislative caucus contributions provided 23 percent of all funds contributed to legislative
candidates during 1983-84, while political parties provided nearly 5 percent of funds
raised. 32 In 1992, the share provided by political parties increased to 9 percent, while
transfers and legislative caucus contributions fell to just 6 percent.
Political parties support the party nominee in close general elections, regardless of
incumbency status. In 1992, political-party contributions went to non-incumbents in
higher rates, on average, than officeholder transfers and legislative caucus contributions
which tend to support incumbents who are part of the gove.rning party organization in the
Legislature. Legislative leaders of both parties are generally responsible for generating
and dispensing these legislatively generated funds.
Although there were over three times as many non-incumbents as incumbents seeking
election in 1992, incumbents received 52 percent of contributions from political parties
and partisan transfers.
Chart 12

Political Party Contributions and Transfers to
State Legislative Candidates 1991-92

mll'lQ.Imberis (82)

48%

•

Non-ll'lQ.Imbents (251)

Source: California Research Bureau

Chart 13 details differences between the two legislative chambers. Assembly seats were
far more competitive than were the Senate races in 1991-92 and one quarter of the
32

California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985.
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partisan Assembly contributions were distributed to non-incumbents. In contrast, 15
percent of the partisan contributions to Senate candidates were made to incumbents. 33
Chart 13

Political Party Contributions and Transfers to
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992
Senate
Assembly

Personal Sources

Family and personal campaign contributions comprised the smallest portion of funds raised
by state legislative candidates during the 1992 election cycle (7 percent). Several
independently wealthy candidates contributed large amounts of their own funds to their
campaigns. In 1992, the average personal contribution was in excess of$23,000,
including a single contribution of nearly $800,000 by an incumbent running for the Senate.
Personal contributions have a more substantial impact on individual legislative outcomes
than their relatively small proportion would suggest. Wealthy candidates tend to
contribute their own funds in substantial amounts when they are engaged in competitive
elections and often do so during critical points in the campaign.
Personal campaign contributions are the only category of contributions in which nonincumbents have an advantage. In 1992, non-incumbents received $4.2 million of the $5.5
million contributed by family sources. This "advantage" is somewhat dubious~ the use of
personal wealth may signify an inability to raise sufficient funds from other sources.
Money contributed by a candidate to his or her campaign may not be regulated by state or
federal laws. The United States Supreme Court ruled in Buckley v. Valeo that limitations
on candidates' expenditures of personal funds, and restrictions on independent
expenditures, are unconstitutional because "those provisions place substantial and direct
restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and associations to engage in protected
political expression. "34 Candidates must voluntarily agree to limit the use of personal
wealth, as any statutory limitations would be ruled unconstitutional. Some states require
candidates receiving public funding to voluntarily limit their personal contributions.
33

The data used for Chart 13 were adjusted to account for the far larger proportion of non-incumbents
seeking election to the Assembly than the Senate.
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Buckley v. Valeo, 1976.
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The use of personal wealth in California elections is increasing markedly. In 1982, two
Senate candidates and twelve Assembly candidates donated more than $20,000 each to
their legislative campaigns. Figures for the 1984 election were similar.3s However, seven
Senate candidates and twenty-four Assembly candidates surpassed the $30,000 mark in
1992,36 including four Senate candidates and six Assembly candidates who contributed
over $100,000. This trend is continuing among both legislative and statewide candidates
in the current election cycle: three gubernatorial candidates were expected to contribute
over $1 million to their own campaigns during the primary alone. 37
The ability to raise funds has long been considered a threshold characteristic for potentially
competitive challengers. It is an advantage to be able to spend considerable amounts of
one's own money, especially during an economic recession when other contributions are
more difficult to secure. "The result: lesser income candidates who can't match
personally-funded million dollar campaigns are increasingly nudged out of the process. "38
Although personal wealth may make legislators "a bit more independent" it may also make
them "a bit more impervious to legitimate constituent pressures" and consequently less
accountable to voters. 39
Chart 14

Personal and Family Contributions to
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-92

mlncumberts (82)
•

Non-lncumbents(251)

Source: California Research Bureau

Chart 15 indicates that there was significant variation between the two legislative
chambers during the 1992 election cycle. Because candidates are unlikely to expend large
sums of their own money in non-competitive races, the fact that Assembly seats were far
3S

California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985.

36 Adjusted for inflation, a $20,000 expenditure is equal to a $29,928 expenditure in 1992.
37 Hayward, April24, 1994.
38fuid.
39 David Canon, quoted in Simpson, 1993.
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more competitive than were the Senate races might be responsible for this difference.
While non-incumbents received just over half of the Senate family contributions, nonincumbents garnered nearly 70 percent of Assembly family contributions. 40
Chart 15

Personal Contributions to
State Legislative Candidates per Candidate 1991-1992
Senate
Assembly
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....=···

Implications of Campaign Fund raising Patterns
Corruption or the Appearance of Co"uption

During the 1992 election cycle, California legislative candidates raised almost 75 percent
oftheir campaign funds ($58.6 million) in contributions in excess of$1,000. In addition,
Chart 16 indicates that large contributors have also played an important role in the
financing of initiative campaigns.
Chart 16
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Source: California Research Bureau and California Commission on Campaign Financing
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Dependence on large contributors, especially PACs, has led to allegations that campaign
contributions distort the political process by providing contributors with disproportionate
access to decision-makers and possible favorable treatment; or at least consideration, on
certain legislative matters. Some commentators blame the proliferation of large
contributors for the loss of public confidence in government and for governmental
"gridlock." Other analysts have argued that interest groups are critical representational
instruments in a pluralistic society. Interest groups organize individuals and voice group
preferences. Their membership gains the attention of governmental decision-makers and
provides important and valued information to the legislative process. The large number of
identifiable interests might ensure that these groups will be constantly competing with one
another, thereby preventing one interest from predominating in highly visible policy
decisions. One interest might, however, dominate a narrow policy arena.
Some public opinion polls have shown that the public generally believes that "most state
legislators are for sale to their largest campaign contributors." A 1990 Los Angeles Times
Poll found that nearly 70 percent of those surveyed believed that "state government is
pretty much run by a few big interests (and not) for the benefit of all the people... members
are too tied to special interests through campaign contributions. "41 The poll, which was
conducted prior to a series of widely reported corruption investigations and the conviction
of several former legislators, also found that 53 percent of those surveyed thought that
"taking bribes is a relatively common practice" of California lawmakers. 42
Incumbency Advantage

Incumbents have a substantial advantage over non-incumbents in raising campaign funds.
As Chart 3 indicated, on average incumbents outraised their challengers by a three to one
margin in the 1992 state legislative elections despite an unprecedented number of open
seats and electoral competition resulting from legislative redistricting. The re-election rate
of California legislators in the 1990's is over 95 percent.
Individuals or groups seeking access to the political process probably contribute campaign
funds to incumbents at much higher rates since incumbents are more likely to defeat their
challengers. Furthermore, incumbents have a broader financial constituency to draw upon
than non-incumbents. Although there were three times as many non-incumbents as
incumbents in 1992, incumbents received over 55,000 separate contributions, while nonincumbents received 33,000. Even after term limits take effect, incumbents will most
likely have adequate time to develop broad financial bases.
Incumbents also have the advantage of being able to raise funds during non-election years.
While non-incumbents are not precluded from raising money in the years prior to an
election, they typically declare their candidacies and begin raising money in January of the
election year. This gives Senate incumbents a three-year advantage, and Assembly
incumbents a one-year advantage over their challengers. Incumbents received 99 percent
41 Skelton, January 3, 1990.
421bid.
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of$19.5 million raised by legislative candidates in 1991 (a non-election year). 43 However,
the incumbency advantage may be overstated. While incumbents have an advantage in
raising money, studies show they have a disadvantage in the electoral impact of spending
that money. This point will be examined in more detail in the following section.
Contribution Limits
Contribution limits are designed to eliminate corruption, or the appearance of corruption,
from the political process by restricting the financial influence of individuals or
organizations who might otherwise contribute disproportionately large sums of money to
political candidates. Contribution limits are also intended to assist non-incumbents in
competing on a more equitable basis against incumbents. Finally, contribution limits are
meant to reduce the amount of money spent in political campaigns.
Forty-two states currently limit the amounts of money that specified contributors may give
to statewide and state legislative candidates. State laws vary based on the categories of
contributors who are limited, and the amount of the maximum contributions. Chart 16
details the number of states that limit specified categories of contributions.
Chart 16

State Limitations and Prohibitions on Contributions
By Source
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Source: The Council of State Governments

The 1990 California election was conducted under Proposition 73 contribution limits.
Unfortunately, computerized campaign finance data services did not gather campaign
finance figures from that election in a format conducive to a comprehensive analysis.
However, experience indicates that contribution limits serve as both a ceiling and as a
43

California Common Cause The Price of Admission, 1993.
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floor for large contributors. For example, if contribution limits are set at $1000 per
candidate per election cycle, 44 contributors who previously .contributed in excess of
$1,000 will instead contribute the maximum amount. Additionally, contributors who
previously gave moderately less than $1,000 will tend to contribute the maximum amount.
Thus, contribution limits tend to increase some contributions while decreasing others.
Eliminate Co"uption!Appearance of Co"uption

Large contributors played an important role in the 1992 state legislative and state ballotmeasure elections. Contribution limits might have dramatically altered contribution
patterns. For example, if$1,000 limits had been in effect for all contributors (excluding
First Amendment-protected personal sources) during the 1992 elections, individual and
personal contributions would probably have increased as a proportion of all contributions
while PAC and partisan contributions would have significantly declined, as shown below. 45
Chart 17

Projected Sources of Contributions
With $1,000 Contribution Limits (1992)
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Contribution limitations can be broadly tailored to yield different contribution patterns.
Chart 17 shows the projected sources of contributions with $1,000 limits for all sources,
but different outcomes can be achieved by altering the maximum contributions. For
example, because individuals and political parties tend to contribute more equally to nonincumbents than PACs, setting individual contribution limits at high levels might benefit
challengers. Increasing individual and party contributions is a frequent reform objective.
Other mechanisms may achieve similar results. Recent studies suggest that offering

44

A $1,000 limit is typical for states with contribution limits.

45

Family and personal contributions are exempt from these limits due to Buckley v. Va/eo.
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substantial tax credits, providing public matching funds, or increasing the number of
legislative districts might also promote individual contributions.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Buckley v. Valeo permits contributors to
make unlimited independent expenditures on behalf of candidates46 • The Buckley decision
ensures that individuals or groups can participate as heavily as they desire in campaigns
provided that their expenditures are not coordinated with a candidate's campaign. The
California Commission on Campaign Financing asserted in 1985 that independent
expenditures would not be widely used in California because independent campaigns are
"difficult to organize, expensive to operate, and unlikely to coalesce around legislative
races." 47 However, that assertion has proven to be incorrect. Chart 19 shows that during
the 1990 election cycle, independent expenditures grew markedly, perhaps as a response
to Proposition 73's direct contribution limits. In 1991-92, after Proposition 73 had been
struck down by the federal court, independent expenditures decreased. This suggests that
contribution limits may re-direct, rather than limit, financial participation in state political
campaigns. The public might prefer that candidates directly control their campaigns rather
than encourage others to independently campaign on the candidates' behalves.
Chart 18
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Arizona's experience also suggests that a possible unintended consequence of contribution
limits may be an increase in independent expenditures. Arizona has the strictest
contribution limits in the country, $240 per candidate per election for individuals and
political committees. "With contribution limits so low, you'd think that no legislator
46

47

Expenditures on behalfofcandidates exclude contributions to candidates.
California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985.
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would feel a debt to any individual donor. You would, of course, be wrong ... political
committees don't sit still once they've given all they can to candidates... some mount
independent expenditure campaigns. "48 Few political coll1ll1ittees or individuals initiate
campaigns on behalf of a candidate due to the expense and organizational difficulty.
However, when independent expenditures are made, they tend to be for large items such
as mass mailings or advertising. In 1990, the average independent expenditure for
California state legislative races was $13,400, including numerous expenditures over
$100,000. These expenditures are especially controversial because, unlike candidates,
independent-expenditure committees are not accountable to voters for their campaign
activities. Nor are state disclosure standards as strict for independent expenditures as for
contributions to and expenditures by candidates.
The dilemma raised by First Amendment protections is significant: "The problem in
campaign finance is that we want completely clean elections with no tainted money, and
we want full and unfettered rights of free speech and association. You cannot have both.
If you're not going to tinker with the First Amendment, you have to accept the fact that
you can't dam the flow of political money." 49
Courts have also cited First Amendment protections when invalidating limitations on
contributions to ballot-measure committees. The Buckley decision established a precedent
by requiring that any infringements on political activities be directly related to preventing
corruption of candidates or the political process. In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, that "the risk of corruption perceived
in cases involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote on a public
issue. "5° However, in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce (1990), the Court
expanded allowable justifications for restrictions on speech to include activities which may
"undermine the integrity of the political process (and) influence unfairly the outcome of
elections."51 This latter decision may be invoked to justify limits on contributions to
ballot-measure committees in the future.
Incumbency Advantage

Since incumbents receive a disproportionate share of political action committee,
corporate, and labor contributions, contribution limits theoretically could mitigate the
incumbent fundraising advantage. However, recent experience indicates that contribution
limits by themselves actually favor incumbents. California Common Cause reports that in
1988 and 1992 (elections with no contribution limits) state legislative incumbents
outraised their challengers by a five to one margin. When contribution limits were in
effect in 1990, incumbents outraised their challengers by eight to one. 52 Analysis of data
48
49

Gurwitt, 1992.
Professor Larry Sabato quoted in Gurwitt, 1992.

so Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 1982.

51 Austin v. Michigan Chamber ofCommerce, 1990.
S2 California Common Cause The Price of Admission. 1993. Common Cause uses a different method for
determining incumbency fundraising advantages than the one described on page 6.
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from the 1992 election cycle suggests that incumbents would have benefited from $1,000
contribution limits on political committees, individuals, and partisan sources.
Incumbents benefit from contribution limits in three ways. First, non-incumbents
disproportionately rely on a few large contributions while incumbents typically draw from
a wider financial base. Second, because incumbents have more time than non-incumbents
to raise money, incumbents find it far easier to attract new contributors. Third, if spending
is reduced by all candidates, incumbents benefit. As Gary Jacobson explains, "any reform
measure which decreases spending by the candidates will favor incumbents. Even though
incumbents raise money more easily from all sources, limits on contributions will not help
challengers because the problem is ... simply getting more money to challengers so that they
can mount competitive races. Anything that makes it harder to raise campaign funds is to
their detriment. 53" In order to be effective and in compliance with the United States
Constitution, contribution limits must strike a balance between the goal of limiting the
amount of contributions and the need of non-incumbents to raise a sufficient amount of
money to compete more equitably.
Reduce Spending

Legislative candidates spent $76 million in 1987-88 and $72 million in 1991-92, but just
$54 million under Proposition 73 limitations during the 1989-90 election cycle. 54 It is not
clear if contribution limits were responsible for this decrease in electoral spending. The
Fair Political Practices Commission suggests that "Proposition 73 may have been a factor
in decreased legislative campaign finance levels (however) the impact of ballot measures
on candidate fundraising is another factor to consider. In particular, the primary election
reapportionment initiatives and general election term limit initiatives may have diverted
campaign funds which would have otherwise been used in legislative contests. "55
While aggregate spending decreased during the 1990 elections, large sums were spent in
some legislative contests. Seven Senate candidates spent over $350,000 each in the
general election and twelve spent over $250,000 each in the primary elections. In contrast,
in the 1992 general election, just five Senate candidates spent in excess of $350,000 each
and ten spent over $250,000 each in the primary. Twenty Assembly candidates exceeded
$225,000 each in the general and sixty-two spent over $150,000 each in the primary in
1990. Two years later,jorty-three candidates spent over $225,000 each in the general,
but just eighteen spent over $150,000 each in the primary.
Furthermore, while strict contribution limits have been in place for congressional elections
since 1974, these "did not prevent campaign spending in those races from escalating
throughout the late 1970's and most ofthe 1980's." 56 The 1994 U.S. Senate contest in
California is a prime example of large campaign spending in spite of contribution limits.
53

Jacobson. 1980.
Fair Political Practices Commission. 1991.
55 Ibid.
56 Alexander, 1991.
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Although contribution limits might limit the amount of money candidates spend, the
overall effect is nearly impossible to estimate because the Buckley decision prohibits
restrictions on the use of personal wealth and independent expenditure campaigns. One
analyst contends that, "donors and candidates all across the country have shown an
endless inventiveness in getting around contribution limits. "57

S7 Gunvitt, 1992.
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SPENDING MONEY: EXPENDITURES AND SPENDING LIMITS

Candidates spend a large amount of money on their campaigns because expenditures have
a significant impact on election results. In the 1992 general state legislative elections,
legislative candidates who outspent their opponents were victorious 94 percent of the
time. In open-seat races, the candidate who spent the most money won 92 percent of the
time. A series of studies during the 1970's found that "what candidates spend in legislative
contests is indeed related to how well they do on election day. "S 8 Recent studies of state
legislative campaigns have discovered that since voters receive relatively little information
regarding state legislative races from independent sources such as the print media, "money
provides candidates with the ability to inform voters about their candidacy and generate
interest in the election ... the effect of campaign expenditures on the outcome should be
substantial. "S 9 Although much is known about the relationship between campaign
spending and electoral outcomes, not much is known in a scientific way concerning how
campaign spending actually influences an individual's vote choice.
Candidates have found that in addition to increasing their share of the vote, campaign
spending can be instrumental in eroding support for other candidates. This fuels an "Arms
Race" mentality in which candidates plan to withstand attacks by their opponents by
outspending them during the campaign. "In both campaigns and weaponry, fear is a
principal motivation. Candidates and countries are afraid the other side will outspend
them. They believe the best security lies in deterrence. They raise massive sums out of
fear they will be outspent by their opponents." 60 A study conducted during the 1988
primary election cycle found that California legislative candidates spent approximately
$20,000 to increase their share of the vote by 1 percent, while reducing their opponent's
share by .8 percent. 6 • More campaign spending evidently pays off. However, the effect of
spending on vote outcome diminishes incrementally. After a certain point, candidates stop
receiving any benefits from spending money, leading Herbert Alexander to assert that,
"perhaps half of all campaign spending is wasted. But no one knows which half "62 So
candidates continue to spend, hoping that one last mailer or 30 second television spot will
put them over the top.
During the 1992 election cycle, candidates for the state Legislature spent a total of
approximately $72 million on their campaigns. Combined spending on an typical Senate
election reached nearly $1 million, while expenditures by Assembly candidates reached
nearly $700,000 per seat. Ballot measure-committees spent a total of approximately $36
million contesting the sixteen statewide propositions on the 1992 primary and general
election ballots. Despite the large sums spent by California candidates and initiative
campaigns, there is very little information available about how this money was spent
during the campaigns. Inadequate information can be attributed, in part, to limited state
ss Jacobson, 1978.
S9 Gierzynski and Breaux "Money and Votes in State Legislative Elections", 1991.
60 California Commission on Campaign Financing, 1985.
61 Gierzynski and Breaux "It's Money that Matters", 1991.
62 Alexander, 1992.
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disclosure requirements. Current disclosure provisions require candidates to list the
recipients of their expenditures, but listing the purpose of the expenditures is not required.
For example, an expenditure to an individual could be a payment for campaign consulting,
signature gathering, or maintenance work.
Spending on initiative campaigns has also been shown to be a critical factor in electoral
outcomes. In recent years, interest groups, certain regulated industries, and individuals
have increasingly relied upon the initiative process to enact public policy measures that
would be difficult or impossible to enact through the legislative process. As Professor
Charles Price reports, due to the advent of paid signature gatherers, high levels of
spending can quality virtually any measure for the ballot. 63 The United States Supreme
Court has ruled that prohibiting individuals from being paid to collect signatures violates
their freedom of speech. 64 In 1992, qualification costs for the seven voter-initiated
propositions ranged from $600,000 to $1.5 million each. 6 S
Once a measure is placed on the ballot, campaign spending continues to have a significant
impact on its eventual success. Studies by Daniel Lowenstein (1982) and David Magleby
( 1984) found that campaign spending is perhaps the most critical resource of an initiative
campaign. Election results may be affected by voter predispositions, the salience of the
issue addressed by a ballot measure, free media available to voters, and the endorsements
secured by both sides of an issue. By and large, however, "groups or interests opposed to
an initiative can virtually guarantee the defeat of an initiative if they significantly outspend
the proponents. "66 One-sided spending on behalf of an initiative apparently has a less
dramatic, although still measurable, effect on voting outcomes.
A general survey of campaign finance reports yields three general classifications of
campaign expenditures: overhead costs; strategic and fundraising expenditures; and voter
contacts.
• Overhead costs comprise the smallest amount of the typical campaign budget and
include campaign staff salaries, rent and utility costs for campaign headquarters, travel
expenditures, and other fixed costs.
• Strategic costs are the fastest growing segment of expenditures nationally67 and
include consulting fees, polling, and fundraising expenses such as mail solicitations.
Campaigns nationally have become increasingly professionalized as volunteer precinct
walkers have given way to million dollar direct mail consultants. As Tommy Neal of
the National Council of State Legislatures explains, "state legislators who a generation
ago walked around the district passing out combs and pencils bearing their names are
now hiring full-time campaign managers, pollsters, advertising specialists, and direct
mail experts. "68
Price, 1992.
Meyer v. Grant, 1988.
California Secretary of State, Qualification Costs of Statewide Initiatives. 1992.
66 Magleby, 1984.
67 Singer, 1989.
68 Neal, 1992.
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•

Voter contacts represent the largest group of expenditures including direct mail, slate
mailers, electronic media advertisements, voter-registration projects, get-out-the-vote
efforts, and phone banks.

Rising Costs?

The aggregate cost of state legislative elections increased dramatically from 1958 until
1990 and is rising again.
Chart 20
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However, two proximate causes of this increase, inflation and population growth, have
been largely overlooked. While inflation has an obvious direct effect on campaign
expenditures, population growth is slightly less intuitive. Population growth affects
campaign spending because, "the larger the district, the higher is the likelihood that the
more expensive methods of reaching people will need to be employed. "69 California
legislative districts are the largest in the nation in terms of population (Senate districts are
larger than congressional districts). 70 As the number of constituents increases, candidates
must spend more money on expensive campaign methods such as television and radio
advertisements and direct mail to reach them. "Smaller constituencies should cut down on
the expenses required to reach voters ... (because) they are more likely to be politically
homogenous; hence incumbent candidates should find it easier to read constituents'
opinions and to hold onto the district without spending a lot ofmoney." 71 It simply costs
a greater amount of money to reach a greater number of people. Many jurisdictions
69
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recognize this when crafting expenditure limit provisions. For example, spending limits
for gubernatorial candidates range from $400,000 in Vermont to $5 million in Florida. In
addition, larger constituencies typically supply candidates With larger campaign chests than
do smaller constituencies, providing candidates with more money to spend.
The amount of money California legislative candidates spent per capita adjusted for
inflation has actually decreased between 1980 and 1992.
Chart 21
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The proportion of the population that is registered to vote in California has remained
relatively constant since 1980; and the amount spent by state legislative candidates per
registered voter shows a similar constant trend. (See charts in Appendix E.)
Incumbency Advantage
During the past two decades, California legislative incumbents have markedly increased
their spending advantage over their challengers. Chart 22 shows that median expenditures
by incumbents in general elections have increased since 1976, but expenditures by
challengers have not grown proportionately.
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Chart 22

Median Expenditures by State Legislative Candidates
1976-1992 General Electionsn
Year
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Senate
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$296,330
$235,894
$210,033

Incumbency spending advantages, based on median amounts spent by candidates, were
3-1 in 1976, over 25-1 in 1986, and decreased to 12-1 during the 1992 general election
cycle. Chart 23 and Chart 24 illustrate median spending by incumbents and challengers as
a proportion of total campaign spending by those individuals during the general elections
between 1976 and 1992.
Chart 23
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Chart 24

Spending by Senate Candidates in General Elections
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Figures from primary elections show a similar pattern. In 1976, Assembly incumbents
typically spent five times more than their opponents, and Senate incumbents spent four
times as much. In 1984, these figures ballooned to an astronomical 105-1 advantage for
Assembly incumbents and a 228-1 advantage for Senate incumbents. During the 1992
primary election cycle, the spending advantage for Assembly and Senate incumbents was
40-1 and 30-1, respectively.
Chart 25

Median Expenditures by State Legislative Candidates
1976-1992 Primary Elections73
Year

Assembly
Incumbents

Assembly
Challengers

Senate
Incumbents

Senate
Challengers

1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988
1990
1992

$25,574
$35,550
$76,024
$94,197
$122,103
$143,930
$193,074
$194,700
$99,537

$5,190
$8,106
$12,219
$11,010
$1,165
$2,615
$3,938
$7,873
$2,474

$36,402
$64,933
$92,380
$132,085
$205,407
$213,390
$276,216
$247,788
$195,396

$8,593
$7,067
$2,730
$3,536
$899
$2,083
$3,249
$3,496
$6,412

73 Ibid.
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Chart 26

Spending by Assembly Candidates in Primary Elections
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Chart 27

Spending by Senate Candidates 1976-1992 Primary Elections
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Despite the substantial spending advantage which incumbents hold over their challengers,
expenditures by challengers have more impact than those by incumbents. An authoritative
study of congressional elections found that due to inherent incumbency advantages, such
as name recognition and the resources of political office to increase that recognition, non. incumbents have the most to gain from campaigning and 11 their level of spending has a
greater impact on the outcomes of elections (because) marginal gains from a given
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increase in campaign spending are much greater for challengers than for incumbents.
What the challenger spends is an important determinant of the outcome, while spending by
incumbents makes relatively little difference. "74 A series of recent studies has
substantiated these findings at the state level, determining that "as in congressional
elections, the effect money has on the vote depends on who is spending: money spent by
challengers has a larger effect than money spent by incumbents. "7S
The Role of Campaign Spending in the Elections Process

Some observers question the ethics and rationale of spending 20 times the salary of an
electoral office on a campaign. It is difficult to evaluate how much money is an
appropriate amount to spend on a campaign. Electoral competition is increased by large
amounts of spending: "the more both candidates spend, the better the challenger does. "76
Furthermore, campaigns provide important information to the electorate. Constituents
require adequate information to hold their representatives accountable. Campaign
expenditures may fill an information void and educate citizens about policy alternatives,
enabling them to competently voice their preferences through voting. The current level of
publicly available state political information is low. For example, a February 1992 Field
Poll found that 72 percent of Californians do not know who their State Senator is and 69
percent do not know who their Assembly Member is. One interpretation of these figures
is that citizens currently do not have enough information about state governmental
institutions and their elected representatives, and therefore might benefit if candidates
spend even more on their campaigns. On the other hand, certain campaign practices might
disillusion voters and further discourage political participation.
It takes a great deal of money to successfully compete for popular attention. State

legislative candidates spent $72 million during the 1991-92 election cycle. However, this
figure pales in comparison to the advertising budgets of major corporations. In 1992, 23
companies individually spent more money advertising in California than the entire
Legislature spent on campaigns. Procter and Gamble, for example, spent approximately
$250 million advertising in California in 1992. 77 While state legislative candidates in
California spent $2.50 per capita in 1992, or $4.00 per registered voter, Washington Post
reporter David Broder notes that the Big Three automobile companies spend an average
of$208 on advertising per customer: "the comparison is not irrelevant. .. one reason the
cost of campaigns is (high) is that candidates are competing, not just with each other, but
with all the other procl.lcts and services being marketed to the American public. Why
should a society that tolerates an avalanche of auto, soft drink, beer, and cold remedy
advertising choke on a relatively small amount of political persuasion. "78 United States
Senator Robert Packwood argues that the United States does not spend "anywhere near
what other democratic countries do on their elections. We do not come near spending
74 Jacobson. 1978.
75 Gierzynski and Breaux "Money
76 Jacobson. 1978.
77 Advertising Age, 1994.
78 Broder, 1991.
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what we do in this country on advertising for pet food. I would like to think that the value
of an election is worth as much as a can of cat food. "79
Expenditure Limits
Expenditure limits are designed to curb excessive campaign spending. Advocates also
believe that they will enable non-incumbents to compete more equitably with incumbents,
although the evidence cited above does not support this position. In 1974, California
voters passed Proposition 9 which included spending ceilings for executive-office
candidates. However, one year later, the United States Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo
decision invalidated those limitations on the grounds that expenditure ceilings are
"substantial restraints on the quality and diversity of political speech (and) the quantity of
expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached. "80
The court determined that First Amendment protections on free speech may only be
restricted if candidates voluntarily accept spending limits in exchange for partial public
funding of elections. Public campaign funding systems typically provide limited matching
funds for contributions up to a specified amount to candidates who agree to limit their
spending. Public funding is a critical and controversial aspect of most spending limit
proposals, and will be addressed separately in this paper. Variable contribution limits are
another mechanism for implementing voluntary expenditure limits which have been
adopted by some municipalities (including the City of Oakland). Under this relatively new
model, candidates who voluntarily accept spending ceilings are allowed to receive larger
contributions than those who choose not to participate. In any event, spending limitations
must be voluntarily accepted by candidates to be constitutional.
Ten states currently limit the amount of money candidates may spend on their campaigns.
Florida and North Carolina offer partial public funding to all executive-office candidates
who limit their expenditures to specified amounts. New Jersey, Maryland, Rhode Island,
and Michigan have similar programs in place for gubernatorial candidates only. Wisconsin
and Minnesota have the two most expansive public financing/expenditure limitation
programs in the country for all state legislative and executive campaigns. New Hampshire
and Hawaii simply set voluntary limits without providing public funds or otherwise
encouraging compliance. Even when adjusted to account for differences in population,
spending limit levels vary significantly between jurisdictions. For example, Maryland
limits gubernatorial candidates to spending $.46 per registered voter while Rhode Island
limits candidates to $2.79 per registered voters.
State campaign-finance systems do not always link public financing with spending limits.
In New Jersey, where 2/3 of the money used for gubernatorial campaigns comes from
public sources, the Election Law Enforcement Commission has "repeatedly advocated

79
80

Congressional Record, June 3, 1987.
Buckley v. Valeo, 1976.
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repeal of expenditure ceilings" and maintenance of public financing provisions. 8 1
Massachusetts has successfully adopted a "floors without ceilings" program to give seed
money to qualifying candidates. This allows all candidates the opportunity to spread their
messages early in a campaign and possibly become more viable candidates. Some
jurisdictions have found creative ways to implement voluntary spending limitations. For
example, while New Hampshire provides no public funds, the state incurs some revenue
loss by waiving filing fees for candidates who voluntarily limit their spending.
Limit Spending

Expenditure limits can have widely differing effects on aggregate spending depending on
the levels of the limits. While neither Proposition 68 nor Proposition 131 became law,
they would have affected campaign spending levels in 1991-92 to a differing degree. In
1988 Proposition 68 proposed to limit Assembly candidates to $150,000 in the primary
election and $225,000 in the general election and Senate candidates to $250,000 and
$3 50,000. In 1990, Proposition 131 proposed higher ceilings of $250,000 for Assembly
primary elections and $400,000 for Assembly general elections, and $425,000 for the
Senate primary and $700,000 for the Senate general. It is interesting to compare these
limits to actual expenditures during the 1991-92 election cycle to estimate the possible
effects of each initiative had they been in effect. Proposition 68 would have affected 15
Senate races and 61 Assembly races in 1991-92, in which candidates spent a total of$14.6
million in excess of the initiative's limits. Proposition 131 would have affected only four
Senate races and 35 Assembly races, in which $8.2 million was spent in excess of the
higher limits. Because only the highest-spending races are affected by campaign
expenditure limitations, spending in other races will tend to increase as a result of the
public financing provisions. Therefore, while some candidates will be limited in their
spending, aggregate spending might actually increase. However, because the U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that campaign spending limits must be purely voluntary, if
ceilings are set too low, candidates may decline the incentives in order to maintain their
desired level of spending.
Independently wealthy candidates and candidates supported by large contributors are most
likely to opt out of spending-limit programs. Therefore, most expenditure-limit proposals
contain specific provisions restricting large contributions, personal contributions to a
candidate's own campaign, and independent expenditures. Without these provisions there
would be few incentives for competitive candidates to limit their spending. Because the
Supreme Court considers independent expenditures and personal money to be "protected
speech" under the First Amendment, any limits on these forms of spending must also be
voluntary. Some jurisdictions provide incentives such as:
• Granting public subsidies to candidates whose opponents benefit from independent
expenditures or who spend more than a specified amount of their personal funds on
their campaigns;
• Removing expenditure limits for candidates whose opponents fail to limit their use of
personal funds or benefit from independent expenditures; or
81

Alexander, 1991.
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•

Requiring candidates who receive public funds to restrict their use of personal funds to
a specified amount.

Increase Competition

Although incumbents raise and spend more money than their challengers, numerous
studies show that limits on spending adversely affect challengers. In the vast majority of
races, incumbents enjoy tremendous advantages over their challengers in name recognition
among the electorate. Because name recognition is "the main electoral asset bought by
money, "82 restricting the amount of money all candidates may spend will hinder the ability
of non-incumbents to compete. Because candidates differ so drastically in the amount of
information citizens have about them, due to incumbency status and other factors,
expenditure limitations tends to solidify this difference, preventing lesser-known
opponents from capturing public attention. For this reason, expenditure limits might work
best in campaigns for open seat races in which no incumbent is running. Without
advantages due to incumbency, more equal spending may result in more equitable
competition. In 1992, challengers finished within ten percentage points of incumbents in
four Assembly general election races. The average amount spent by the four challengers
was well over $350,000. It is possible that these challengers would have had a more
difficult time competing if expenditure limits had prohibited this high level of spending.

82

Polsby, 1988.
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PUBLIC FINANCING OF CAMPAIGNS
Since Utah, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Iowa became the first four states to adopt partial
public financing systems in 1973, twenty-five states have implemented public financing
mechanisms in varying forms for state elections. Although Proposition 73 prohibits
expenditures of public funds on political campaigns, California's tax code has allowed
taxpayers to contribute to political parties with their income tax payments since 1982.
State law permits individual taxpayers to contribute $1, $5, $10, or $25 to the California
Election Campaign Fund. The California Franchise Tax Board disperses these
contributions to the political party central committee designated by the taxpayer on the
state income-tax form. The Franchise Tax Board deducts the program's operating costs
from the fund, leaving political parties with modest sums. Chart 28 shows how much
taxpayers have designated on their state tax forms to various parties since 1982.
Chart 28

Distribution of Funds to California Political Parties 1982-1991 83
Year
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991

Democratic
$233,819
$139,056
$110,011
$122,253
$119,316
$105,948
$94,166
$105,332
$77,516
$75,045

Republican
$146,446
$120,022
$114,908
$117,131
$99,167
. $79,531
$76,426
$79,869
$60,464
$44,957

Peace & Freedom
$12,065
$4,971
$3,371
$3,454
$3,414
$2,031
$1,641
$1,626
$2,091
$1,433

Libertarian
$7,268
$4,138
$3,796
$3,252
$2,921
$2,780
$2,971
$2,936
$3,119
$3,080

Independent
$6,692
$2,207
$1,230
$1,387
$1,542
$923
$759
$1,517
$674
$1,008

Although detailed figures are not available for 1992 or 1993, the Franchise Tax Board
reports that total contributions to the program were approximately $120,000 each year.
Public financing systems vary in four ways: the breadth of the program, the qualifications
for receiving funds, the manner in which revenue is generated for the program, and the
manner in which money is dispersed.

Breadth of the Program: Recipients and Elections
Public financing systems differ by which offices and elections are included in the program.
• Gubernatorial: In 1995, twelve states will provide some form of public funding to
gubernatorial candidates. Of those, just four states (Florida, Hawaii, Massachusetts,
and New Jersey) provide funds for primary elections as well as general elections.
• Executive Branch Officials: Six states include other statewide candidates in their
programs.

83
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Legislative: Four states provide public funds to state legislative candidates.
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Nebraska (as of 1994) provide matching funds to state
legislative candidates in general elections. Hawaii is the only state to include primary
elections for legislative candidates.
Political Parties: Fourteen states provide public funds to political parties.

Because campaign spending impacts primary election results more than general election
results, 84 reformers have suggested that public funding programs designed to enhance the
ability of challengers to compete should include primary campaigns. Due to the number of
legislative districts in which one party has a large registration advantage, competition
might be more readily stimulated in primary elections.
However, public financing can be a relatively costly program. Some states have phased it
in gradually by beginning with general gubernatorial elections and expanding to other
offices and primary elections. Chart 29 summarizes public financing provisions for the
twenty-one fully-operational state programs currently in operation. States which enacted
programs taking effect in 1994 are not included in this chart. (See Chart 32).
Chart 29

Public Financing Programs Nationally: Breadth of Systems85
State
Alabama
Arizona
California
Florida
Hawaii
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Indiana
Iowa
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Michigan
Minnesota
Montana
New Jersey
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Qualifications to Receive Public Funds

One of the most controversial aspects of public financing systems is determining which
candidates will receive money. Simply allowing any candidate who qualifies for the ballot
to receive public funds might encourage fringe candidates, while excessive qualifYing
requirements might unconstitutionally benefit incumbents or majority-party candidates.
Most commonly, public funding systems for legislative or statewide office require
candidates to raise a threshold amount of money to demonstrate that they are viable
candidates. Some jurisdictions, instead, allow candidates to obtain a specified number of
voter signatures to qualify for public campaign financing.
The national public campaign-financing system for presidential elections relies on party
registration to determine which minor party candidates are eligible for federal matching
funds. To receive federal matching funds for his or her campaign, a presidential
candidate's party must have received at least five percent of the vote in the previous
presidential general election. Minnesota employs a similar rule, requiring minor parties to
reach 10 percent of the vote in previous gubernatorial elections before its candidates
become eligible for matching funds. Most jurisdictions require candidates to have
opposition in order to receive public funds.
Revenue Generation to Fund Public Financing Programs

Revenue raising is a critical component of a public-financing system. There are generally
three different ways to fund a public-financing program: tax check-off systems, tax add-on
systems, and general fund revenues.
A tax check-off system allows taxpayers to earmark a small portion of their tax liability
(typically between $1 and $5) to an election fund that provides public funds to candidates
and/or political parties. Proposition 68, had it been implemented, would have been funded
by a taxpayer check-off system. While public participation varies across the country, 14.5
percent of taxpayers participated in their state check-off systems on average in 1990. 86
This amount represents a sign!ficant decrease from previous rates: "participation in the
states reached a high in the late 1970's and early 1980's and has been steadily declining
since." 87
The Presidential Election Campaign Fund, which allows taxpayers to earmark one tax
dollar to fund presidential primary and general elections, has experienced a similar decline
in participation. The Fund increases disbursements with inflation, but does not adjust the
one-dollar check-offfor inflation. The decline in taxpayer participation at the fixed $1
contribution level coupled with increased disbursements might have forced the fund to run
a deficit in 1996. 88 However, Congress recently enacted reforms that raised the
designation amount to a $3 voluntary designation.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Pace, 1994.
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Chart 30
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The tax add-on system pennits taxpayers to voluntarily increase their tax liability by a
specified amount and to earmark that sum to an election fund. Strictly speaking, this is
not a public-funding mechanism. Because the system relies on voluntary contributions
from taxpayers, tax add-on systems simply funnel private contributions into a political
fund for governmental distribution to candidates and political parties, without expending
public funds. While the add-on system is popular among political officials because it does
not detract from tax revenues or place additional burdens on the state budget, it also
ensures that taxpayers will participate less than in tax check-offsystems.89 In California,
the proportion of taxpayers choosing to increase their tax burden to contribute to political
parties decreased from a high of. 9% to a projected low of .4% in 1994. 90 If California
chose to provide substantial public subsidies to candidates competing for statewide or
state legislative office, it would have to explore funding sources in addition to the tax addon system. The largest amount collected for the fund, over $400,000 in 1982, would be
insufficient to fund a fully-functional state public campaign-financing system. 91

89 Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992.
90
91

Ibid and California Franchise Tax Board.
California Franchise Tax Board.
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Chart 31

Participation Rates of Eligible Taxpayers
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State general-purpose funds are the third possible source of public funds for political
campaigns. Five states (Florida, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Jersey, and Rhode Island)
transfer general-fund revenues to state political election funds when revenues from their
tax check-off programs are insufficient to balance the program costs. This assures that the
public campaign fund systems can survive decreased taxpayer participation. It is also
likely to place a substantial burden on the state budget. California's Proposition 131, had
it passed, would have allocated $5 million from the state General Fund to augment a tax
check-off program. The Legislative Analyst estimated that had Proposition 68 been
implemented, its public financing provisions, not including administrative costs, would
have reached approximately $9 million in 1988. The Legislative Analyst estimated that
Proposition 13 1, which included higher funding levels and included both statewide
executive and state legislative candidates, would have cost approximately $17 million in
1990.92
Dispersal of Public Funds

When states provide public funds to candidates, they most often adopt a system of
matching private contributions with public money at a specified rate. Some jurisdictions
utilize matching-funds to provide incentives for candidates to alter their fundraising
patterns. These jurisdictions identify what they believe to be more "desirable"
contributions, such as small individual donations or in-district contributions, and augment
them at high levels with public funds. Seattle has successfully implemented a matching
funds system that has dramatically altered candidates' fundraising patterns (Appendix D).
92

California Ballot Pamphlet, Primary Election 1988 and General Election 1990.
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The total amount of money available to candidates from matching-funds programs
depends primarily upon the match ratio, which is typically ~etween 1-1 and 5-l publicprivate. The programs also usually specify a maximum contribution level for these
matches, usually between $50 and $500 per contribution. Some programs (typically those
without expenditure ceilings) specifically limit the amount of public money available to
each candidate in order to prevent runaway fundraising and excessive spending.
Other jurisdictions offer qualifying candidates direct public grants. This alternative is less
common than offering matching-funds and yields different potential benefits. Candidates
often need to establish themselves early in a campaign to gain credibility and attract
potential contributors. Direct public grants might allow candidates to build a constituency
base and become competitive earlier. This might enable less well-known candidates to
compete more equally for private contributions with their already-established opponents.
Unlike matching funds, block grants do not specifically encourage certain types of
contributions. However, jurisdictions executing grant systems minimize their
administrative expenses by issuing a single governmental check to each qualified
candidate. Conversely, administering agencies for matching funds programs must process
each qualifying contribution separately, thereby raising administrative costs.
More complicated public funding proposals have been advanced. Some reformers have
suggested providing state-subsidized television and radio broadcasting time. Electronic
advertising comprises a relatively high proportion of campaign expenditures in California,
and especially for statewide candidates. A similar proposal is to provide candidates with
voter-contact vouchers to defray the costs of mailing, printing, broadcasting, or engaging
in other activities that promote direct political dialogue with voters. All qualifying
candidates would probably receive a fixed sum of state funding under either system. An
alternative proposal, creating a comprehensive-contribution voucher system received
national attention in the 1960's and 1970's. This system would severely restrict and
possibly prohibit the use of private money for politic~} campaigns. Each citizen would be
given a state-funded voucher that could be contributed to a candidate or candidates for
campaign use. Vouchers would be the only acceptable form of currency for campaign
contributions and expenditures~ the use of greenbacks for political purposes would be
considered a form of corruption. 93
The Debate on Public Financing- The Case For Public Funds

Public financing, according to proponents, can mitigate the role of special interests and
large contributors while altering fundraising patterns of candidates for political office.
Public funds represent an additional independent source of funds from the traditional
sources: political action committees, business, and labor~ individuals~ partisan sources; and
family money. Unlike these other sources, public funding is not attached to a candidate's
support of certain policies or interests. A comprehensive study of electoral competition
and campaign finance conducted by Stanford University Professor David Baron
discovered that public financing reduces the incentives for candidates to cater to interest
93

For a complete discussion of campaign voucher proposals, see Ackerman, 1993.
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groups while strengthening the "incentive to compete for the informed vote. "94 If a goal
of campaign finance reform is to increase the relative proportion of a certain type of
contribution, such as small individual donations, a matching funds program might help
accomplish this objective.
Public financing might also enable candidates to compete on a more equitable basis
regardless of incumbency status or personal wealth. Data suggest that increased spending
by all candidates, regardless of incumbency status, benefits challengers and other less well
known candidates. Public funding can be made available to challengers in equal sums as
incumbents, resulting in a substantial benefit to those candidates who are
disproportionately disadvantaged at raising money from other sources. This may
encourage a broader section of the population to consider seeking political office by
making it easier for candidates to become viable. For example, in each Wisconsin election
since 1982, challengers have received a far greater proportion of public funds, per
candidate, than incumbents. 9 s As David Baron explains, "public financing of elections
increases the probability of winning of the candidate who is the underdog. "96 In addition,
public financing programs might encourage candidates to voluntarily limit other campaign
activities in exchange for receiving public funds. For example, if public funds are
sufficiently generous, individually wealthy candidates might agree to refrain from
contributing exorbitant sums of money to their own campaigns.
Public financing might limit some of the adverse consequences of contribution limits as
they affect challengers, and facilitate the adoption of expenditure limits. As former Fair
Political Practices Commission Chairman Daniel Lowenstein explains, "limits on
contributions must be accompanied by public subsidies. Then the limits could be low
enough to curb the influence of special interests while ensuring that candidates have
enough money so that they can devote their time and energy to discussing the issues. "97
In addition, public funding provides the only constitutionally approved system for limiting
the amount of money which candidates for political office may spend. 98
The Debate on Public Financing- The Case Against Public Funds

Critics of public financing of elections believe that campaigning for elected office is a
private action undertaken by individuals competing in a private marketplace of ideas.
Former Senator William Campbell explained, "why should the public have to pay for the
government that they are getting? The least we can do is be compassionate enough not to
foist on them the idea that not only do they have to pay for the candidate once he gets in
office, but they have to pay to help get him into office. "99 They argue further that public
financing creates a new bureaucracy that promotes governmental intrusion into private
94

Baron. 1994.
Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz. 1992.
96 Baron. 1994.
97 California Commission on Campaign Financing. 1985.
98 Variable contribution limits have yet to pass any significant court tests. Please see Appendix IV.
99 Alexander and Haggerty, 1980.
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activities: supporting and helping to elect candidates for political office. Critics also
suggest that public financing forces taxpayers to contribute money to candidates they do
not necessarily support, impinging on their First Amendment rights.
In addition to making these philosophical arguments, opponents of public financing also
maintain that public financing is not an effective campaign finance measure. Rather than
improving competition, it simply encourages a large number of non-viable candidates to
seek election. The ballot-pamphlet argument against Proposition 68 claimed that public
funding "will encourage irresponsible extremist groups to run for legislative office, not to
win election, but to become eligible for tax dollars to finance their cause ... no matter how
repugnant their views or how few votes they get at the polls." too Opponents of public
financing argue that the ability to raise money is a reliable test of a candidate's popularity
and viability and that providing public funds simply dilutes that process.

Comprehensive Financing Systems

Comprehensive campaign finance reform proposals include all of the three variables
discussed so far: contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public financing. Alone, the
three variables have different purposes and yield different results. The net result of a
comprehensive system depends in large part on the emphasis of the program enacted. For
example, strict contribution limits will result in a far different system than less stringent
contribution limits in the same comprehensive system. Similarly, low expenditure limits or
low levels of public funding will have a different impact than high spending limits and an
expansive public-funding program. A recent study found that high levels of public funding
can dramatically increase competition; low level funding coupled with expenditure limits
might actually decrease competition. tot

· 100
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DISCLOSURE OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE INFORMATION

The purpose of public disclosure is to ensure that the public has information regarding
how candidates raise and spend money prior to elections so that they can hold the
candidates accountable for their campaign-financing practices. The Political Reform Act
of 1974 states: "The people enact this title to accomplish the following purposes: Receipts
and expenditures in election campaigns should be fully and truthfully disclosed in order
that the voters may be fully informed and improper practices may be inhibited."1°2
Variables of Campaign Finance Disclosure

Public disclosure of campaign finance data involves a number of variables:

• Filers: California law requires candidates, committees, and elected officeholders who
raise or spend more than a specified amount of money to file campaign statements with
the Secretary of State.
• Threshold Levels: Candidates, elected officers, and committees established to support
or oppose a ballot measure are required to report all contributions and expenditures of
$100 or more and the sum of all contributions under $100. Any person or group of
people receiving contributions totaling $1,000 or more, making independent
expenditures totaling $1,000 or more, or making contributions totaling $10,000 or
more in one calendar year, also must file a statement detailing all contributions of $100
or more. In addition, any committee making independent expenditures that total $500
or more must report all expenditures in excess of$100.
• Frequency: Candidates, elected officers, and ballot measure and political committees
are required to file semi-annual statements and two pre-election statements before
each primary and general election.
• Timing: Candidates must file semi-annual statements by July 31 and December 31.
Pre-election statements for June elections are required by March 22 and by 12 days
before the election. Pre-election statements for November elections are due on or
before October 5, and by 12 days before the election.
• Public Access: Campaign statements are public records and are maintained for public
review by the California Secretary of State.
• Enforcement: The Fair Political Practices Commission, a non-partisan appointed
body, has primary responsibility for the administration and implementation of
campaign finance regulations, including investigating possible violations, determining
when violations have occurred, and imposing fines.
Public access to campaign finance information is an important component of a campaigndisclosure system. While California has relatively extensive disclosure provisions, the
Secretary of State maintains this information in a cumbersome format that is essentially
unavailable for analysis by individual citizens. After each filing deadline, stacks of
campaign reports, some hundreds of pages long, line the tables in the Secretary of State's
office. There is a wealth of information available in these reports, but citizens cannot
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realistically compile and analyze the data in a timely manner. Aside from the public
interest groups who synthesize and disseminate the information to voters, the data go
unscrutinized. In contrast, the Washington Public Disclosure Commission has a computer
access system which makes free on-line campaign-finance data available to the public
through computer bulletin boards.
The United States Supreme Court, in considering whether disclosure provisions violate
First Amendment protections on rights to privacy of association and belief, ruled that
compelled disclosure, while a substantial infringement on privacy rights, is acceptable if it
serves a compelling state interest. The court found that the disclosure of campaign
information will "alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to be
responsive ... (and) deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by
exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity." 103 Implementing
additional disclosure requirements, such as lower threshold levels, increasing frequency of
filings, and improving public access must also meet these objectives. While improving
public access to campaign finance data clearly serves these purposes, the courts might find
that more onerous disclosure provisions conflict with First Amendment protections.
Major candidates for statewide and state legislative offices typically have a campaign
treasurer or staff member responsible for compiling campaign finance reports. However,
less well-funded candidates may find more demanding disclosure provisions to be
excessively burdensome.
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROVISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

State
Alabama

Contribution Limits

Expenditure Limits

Unlimited, except $500
limits on corporations.

None.

Alaska

$1.000 per year from all

None.

Arizona

Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut

Delaware

Florida

sources.
PACs and individuals
limited based on the office~
corporate and labor
contributions are prohibited.
$1,000 per election from all
sources.
Unlimited, except for
special elections.
Unlimited.
PACs and individuals
limited based on the office~
corporate and labor
contributions are prohibited.
$1.200 per election to
statewide candidates and
$600 to district candidates
from all sources.
$500 per election from all
sources.

Georgia

$3,500 per election from all

Hawaii*

$2,000 per election period

Chart 32
Public Financing
Grants to political
parties from tax addon.
Not Available.

None.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.

None.

Not Available.

None.

None.
None.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.
Not Available.
Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

Executive office
candidates accepting
public funds limited to
spending $5 million for
Governor and $2 million
for cabinet races.
None.

Matching funds to
executive office
candidates limiting
campaign spending
from tax add-on and
state ~eneral funds.
Not Available.

All state candidates
accepting public funds
limited to spending based
on voter remstration.
None.

Grants to all state
candidates limiting
campaign spending
from tax check-off.
Grants to political
parties from tax
check-off.
Not Available.
Grants to political
parties from license
plate revenue.

sources.
from all sources.

Idaho

Unlimited.

Illinois
Indiana

Unlimited.
Unlimited, except
corporations and labor are
limited to aggregate levels
per election.
Unlimited, except corporate
and labor contributions are
prohibited.

Iowa
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Kansas

Kentucky

Louisiana

Maine

Maryland

$2,000 per election to
statewide candidates,
$1,000 to Senate and $500
to House candidates from
all sources.
$4;000 per election from all
sources, except $6,000 from
political parties, and
corporate contributions
prohibited.
$5,000 per election to
statewide candidates,
$2,500 to district candidates
from all sources. Broadbased PACs limited to 2x's
this amount.
Individual contributions
limited to $1,000 per
election, all other sources
limited to $5,000.
$4,000 per candidate and
$10,000 aggregate per
election from all sources.

None.

Not Available.

Candidates accepting
contributions in higher
levels subject to specified
spending limitations.

Grants to political
parties from tax
check-off.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.

Gubernatorial and Lt.
Governor candidates
accepting public funds
limited to spending $.20
per capita.

Matching funds to
Governor and Lt.
Governor candidates
limiting campaign
spending from state
e:eneral funds.
Matching grants to
qualifying statewide
candidates from tax
add-on.

Individual contributions
limited to $1,000, PAC and
labor contributions are
unlimited, and corporate
contributions are prohibited.
$3,400 per election to
statewide candidates,
$1,000 to Senate and $500
to House candidates from
all sources; corporate
contributions prohibited.

None.

Minnesota*

All sources limited based on
the office, ranging from
$250-$20,000.

Mississippi

Unlimited, except
corporations limited to
$1,000 per election.
Unlimited.
All sources limited based on
the office, ranging from
$250-$8,000.

All state candidates
accepting public funds
limited to spending
between $20,335-$1.6
million, depending on the
office.
None.

Massachusetts*

Michigan

Missouri
Montana
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Gubernatorial candidates
accepting public funds
limited to spending $1.5
million.

None.
None.

Matching funds to
Gubernatorial
candidates limiting
campaign spending
from tax check-off
and state general
funds.
Matching funds to all
state candidates
limiting campaign
spending from tax
check-off.
Not Available.

Not Available.
Grants to qualifying
gubernatorial and
Supreme Court
candidates from tax
add-on.
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Nebraska
Nevada

New Hampshire

New Jersey

Unlimited.
Individuals limited to
$10,000 per statewide
candidates and $5,000 per
district candidate per
election. Other sources are
limited to 2x's this amount.
$5,000 per election to
candidates limiting their
spending, $1,000 to all
other candidates from all
sources.
$1,500 per election from
individuals, corporations,
and labor unions, $5,000
from PACs. Unlimited
transfers between
candidates.

None.
None.

Not Available.
Not Available.

Candidates voluntarily
accepting limitations
subject to limits
depending on the office.

Not Available.

Gubernatorial candidates
accepting public funds
limited to spending $2.2
million in the primary
and $5 million in the
general elections.

Matching funds to
gubernatorial
candidate limiting
campaign spending
from tax check-off
and state general

Unlimited.
Aggregate limits based on
population for all sources~
PACs are unlimited.
$4,000 per election from all
sources, except corporate
and labor contributions are
prohibited.

None.
None.

Not Available.
Not Available.

Executive office
candidates accepting
public funds limited to
spending depending on
the office..

Grants to political
parties from tax
check-off. Grants to
executive office
candidates limiting
campaign spending
from tax add-on.
Not Available.

funds.

New Mexico
New York
North Carolina

North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma

Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
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Unlimited, except corporate
and labor contributions are
prohibited.
Unlimited, except corporate
contributions are prohibited.

None.

$5,000 per calendar year
from all sources, except
corporate contributions are
prohibited.
Unlimited.

None.

Unlimited, except corporate
and labor contributions are
prohibited.
$2,000 per calendar year
from all sources.

None.

None.

None.

Candidates accepting
contributions in higher
levels subject to specified
spending limitations.

Grants to political
parties from tax
check-off.
Not Available.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.
Not Available.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.
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South Carolina

$3,000 per year to statewide
candidates and $1,000 to
district candidates from all
sources.
Individuals limited to
$1,000 per year to statewide
candidates and $250 to
district candidates, PAC
contributions are unlimited,
corporate and labor
contributions are prohibited.
Unlimited, except corporate
contributions are prohibited.
Unlimited, except corporate
and labor contributions are
prohibited.
Unlimited.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Vermont*

$1,000 per election from all
sources.

Virginia

Unlimited.

Candidates volwttarily
accepting limitations
subject to limits
depending on the office,
ranging from $2,000$400,000.
None.

Grants to political
parties from tax
check-off.
Not Available.

Washington

Aggregate contribution
limits of $50,000 to
statewide candidates and
$5,000 to district candidates
from all sources.
$1,000 per election from all
sources, except corporate
contributions are prohibited.

South Dakota

Tennessee
Texas
Utah

None.

Grants to political
parties from tax addon.
Not Available.

Not Available.
Candidates volwttarily
accepting limitations
subject to limits
depending on the office,
ranging from $12,500-$1
million.
Matching funds to all
Limitations
based
on
the
All state candidates
Wisconsin*
office and source of
accepting public funds
state candidates
limited to spending
limiting campaign
contributions as a
proportion of spending limit between $17,250-$1
spending from tax
levels.
million, depending on the check-off.
office.
Individuals limited to
None.
Not Available.
Wyoming
$1,000 per candidate and
$25,000 aggregate per
election; PAC contributions
are unlimited, corporate and
labor contributions are
prohibited.
Note: States marked with an • are described in more detail in Appendix D.

West Virginia*
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CAMPAIGN FINANCE PROVISIONS IN SELECTED LOCAL JURISDICTIONS
Chart 33
City
Contribution Limits
Expenditure Limits
Public Funding
$250
per
election
from
all
None.
Not Available.
Berkeley

Long Beach

Los Angeles*

sources.
$250 for City Council,
$350 for citywide, and
$500 for Mayoral
candidates per election
from all sources.
$250 for City Council and
$1,000 for citywide
candidates per election
from all sources.

All contributions to
citywide candidates are
limited to $6,500.
Contributions to other
city candidates are
limited to $3,000.
Individuals limited to
Oakland*
$500 and broad-based
PACs $1,000 per election
to candidates limiting
campaign spending.
Individuals limited to
$100 and broad-based
PACs $250 to all other
candidates per election.
Individuals limited to
Sacramento
$500 per election to City
Council and $1,000 to
citywide candidates.
PACs limited to $1,500
per election for City
Council and $3,900 for
citywide candidates.
$250 per election from
San Diego*
individuals, all other
sources are prohibited.
San Francisco $500 per election from all
sources.
$250 per election from all
San Jose
sources.
$350 per election from all
Seattle*
sources.

New York*

City candidates accepting
public funds limited to
spending between
$60,000-$300,000
depending on the office.
City candidates accepting
public funds. limited to
spending between
$300,000-$2 million,
depending on the office.
Voluntary expenditure
limitations range from
$105,000 to $4 million
per election depending on
the office.
Candidates accepting
contributions in higher
levels subject to specified
spending limitations
based on the salary of the
office being sought.

Matching funds to city
candidates limiting
campaign spending from
city general funds.
Matching funds to city
candidates limiting
campaign spending from
city general funds.
Qualifying candidates who
agree to limit their spending
may receive public
matching funds up to
$1,000 per contributor from
the City General Fund
Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

None.

Not Available.

Voluntary limitations of
$250,000 for Mayoral
candidates and $110,000
for all other city
candidates.

Qualifying candidates who
agree to limit their spending
may receive public
matching funds up to $50
per contributor from the
Seattle General Fund.

Note: Cities marked with an * are described in more detail in Appendix D
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OPTIONS
There is tremendous variation in campaign finance programs at the federal, state, and local
levels. (See Charts 32 and 33, pages 48-52). This variation provides a wide range of
potential systems for consideration. Unfortunately, comparative evaluations of the various
systems are extremely difficult because each jurisdiction has unique characteristics and
concerns and campaign finance provisions reflect those differences. For example, while
low contribution and expenditure levels may be appropriate for small, politically
homogenous jurisdictions (such as some California cities), much higher levels are suitable
for a large state with historically competitive elections, highly professionalized campaigns
and large electoral districts. Therefore, it is useful to consider standards based on
California's unique circumstances rather than borrowing specific reforms based solely on
the experience of other jurisdictions.
This section suggests some standards for framing and considering campaign finance
reforms, discusses various issues related to the crafting of such reforms, and suggests
alternative mechanisms for accomplishing some reform objectives. Each of the options
could have a substantial impact on the conduct of California electoral campaigns. None of
the alternatives is politically neutral and each might disproportionately benefit one or more
groups of political actors or lead to "unintended consequences," given the interrelated
nature of political systems. While not necessarily recommendations of the author or the
California Research Bureau, the following are potential options for action.
Of course, one alternative is to maintain the current system of campaign financing in
California without adopting changes. Some commentators have argued that enacting
campaign finance reforms would simply lead to greater governmental intrusion into private
activities and that increased regulation of campaign activities would yield undesirable
results. Others have suggested that the current system for financing campaigns in
California encourages full participation by large segments of society and that establishing
limits on the activities of these political actors might discourage participation in the
political and electoral process. Finally, some critics of campaign finance reform have
suggested that the United States Supreme Court's Buckley v. Valeo decision equating
money with protected speech ensures that those who want to participate in the financing
of political campaigns will be able to do so in spite of any reforms that may be
implemented; this participation will merely take a different form.
This final complaint regarding the constraints placed on reform efforts by the Supreme
Court's ruling leads to a separate alternative, challenge the Buckley decision. In the long
run, challenging Buckley, and possibly persuading the Court to adopt an alternative
definition of protected speech might be a central component of any movement toward
reform. If the Court were to overturn or amend Buckley, a host of potential alternatives
would become available for legislative consideration.
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Contribution Limits

States differ fundamentally on the amount of money individuals or committees may
contribute to candidates (Arizona and Montana restrict contributions to $250 while New
York prohibits contributions in excess of$100,000). They also vary on the application of
these limits to different contributors, and on the period of time in which the limits are
applied. This variation indicates the difficulty of establishing appropriate and rational
levels for contribution limits.

Contribution Limit Standards:
Each of the following strategies suggest a standard upon which contribution limits may be
based: personal income, campaign expenditures, and current contribution patterns.
Personal Income: The annual per capita income of California residents is approximately
$21,350. Contribution limits could be established as a function of this level, such as ten
percent, or $2,13 5 per year, from individuals. One direct benefit of this standard is that it
would naturally adjust annually for inflation. The individual contribution limit could serve
as a benchmark level for limits on other types of contributors, such as PACs.
Proportion ofFundraising/Spending: Contribution limits must be designed to serve the
compelling governmental interest of eliminating corruption, or the appearance of
corruption in order to meet constitutional standards. Given this standard, it makes sense
to limit contributions to a proportion of all funds raised or spent during an election cycle.
Candidates could be limited to accepting a set percentage of funds from a single source,
based on average fundraising levels by competitive candidates during the previous election
cycle (adjusted for inflation). Competitive candidates for the Senate raised and spent
$550,000 on average for both elections combined. Competitive Assembly candidates
raised and spent $450,000 on average. For example, one percent of these average
fundraising levels would be $5,500 for the Senate and $4,500 for the Assembly, a possible
contribution limit. Instead, if expenditure limits are a part of the program, contributions
could be limited to a percentage of these spending levels. For example, one percent of
Proposition 131's expenditure limits would be $6,500 per election cycle for Assembly
candidates and $11,250 for Senate candidates. "One percent ceilings" would amount to
$3,750 and $6,000 for candidates for the Assembly and Senate, respectively, under
Proposition 68 expenditure limits. Further, contributions could be limited to aggregate
levels by source. For example, candidates could be prohibited from receiving
contributions in excess of one-third of the spending limits from either PACs or political
parties, ensuring that individual contributions would comprise at least 1/3 of all
contributions.
Current Contribution Patterns: Contribution ceilings could be based on current
contribution patterns. For example, California legislative candidates in competitive
elections currently receive, on average, 150 contributions of$1,000 or more, including 20
contributions of$5,000 or more and 10 contributions of$10,000 or more. If all
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contributions, regardless of source, were capped at $5,000, candidates would generally
receive approximately twenty or more "maximum contributions." This would limit the
impact of any single contributor.
,
Variation by Source

Contribution limits generally vary for different sources. Typically, reform efforts are
designed to encourage small individual contributions, which are more widely spread
among the population and less significant on an individual basis than large contributions
from wealthy individuals or interest groups. Similarly, contributions from political parties,
which aggregate funds from many sources, may represent a more generalized interest.
Because political action committees and political parties are ultimately financed by
individual contributions, it seems appropriate that a level established for individual
contributions be adjusted upward to account for the aggregation of individuals in political
committees. Some analysts also value contributions from within a representative's district
more highly. Others contend that elected officials must represent the entire jurisdiction,
not just a district, and that contributions from outside a district are of equal democratic
value.

•

Individuals: Existing contribution limit systems typically limit individuals in the
amount of money they may contribute to any candidate or committee (including
political parties). An alternative approach is to set aggregate individual contribution
limit levels. For example, an individual could be limited to contributing up to $50,000
to all candidates for state office. These aggregate limits typically compliment per
candidate contribution limits, but may also be adopted alone.
• Political Action Committees: PACs are aggregations of individual contributors and
therefore have higher contribution limits, usually two or three times the limit for
individuals. An alternative is to limit narrow, limited membership PACs, while
adopting less stringent limits for broad-based political committees. California law
currently distinguishes between these different kinds of PACs.
• Broad-Based PACs: To qualify for this classification in California, committees must
receive contributions from one hundred or more sources and contribute to five or
more candidates. In some jurisdictions, broad-based PACs are prohibited from
receiving contributions in excess of certain amounts (typically between one-fifth and
one-tenth of individual limits). For example, ifindividuals are limited to contributing
$1,000 to a candidate, PACs are typically required to accept a certain number of
individual contributions of $200 or less to achieve this designation. Since broad-based
PACs bundle a large number of small contributions, the typical contribution limits are
high, often ten times the level for individuals.
• Political Parties: There are 1, 600 PACs in California and just 6 registered political
parties. Parties clearly represent larger aggregates of individuals, as required by state
law for ballot status. Currently, new political parties must register approximately
&0,000 individuals in order achieve ballot status. Furthermore, political parties fulfill
an important function in the electoral system by organizing broad coalitions around
policy preferences. Voters can hold officials accountable for actions of the governing
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•

or minority party, facilitating democratic choice. Analysts generally feel that
contribution limits for political parties should be very high or non-existent.
Partisan Transfers: It may be unconstitutional to limit partisan transfers of campaign
funds from officeholders and legislative leadership to party candidates. (See Appendix
A for a discussion of the constitutional issues involved).

Time Period for Limits
The period of time within which contribution limits are in effect varies in different
jurisdictions. Constitutional issues are involved if the period of time disadvantages nonincumbent candidates. (See Appendix A).

• Per Election Cycle: Contributors could give up to the maximum amount to a
candidate over the entire two or four-year election cycle, depending on the office
being sought by the recipient of the contribution.
• Per Election: Contributors could contribute up to a maximum amount for both
primary and general elections. This might disadvantage candidates in competitive
districts because they would have the additional burden of raising funds twice from
their contributors.
• Per Calendar Year: Contributors could give up to the maximum amount to an
officeholder or political committee each calendar year. This would tend to benefit
incumbents or open seat candidates who declare their candidacies far in advance of an
election. (See pages 20 and 24).
• Per Fiscal Year: Contribution limits based on fiscal year cycles have been declared
unconstitutional by the federal courts. (See Appendix A).
Other Contribution Limits
A number of other potential issues surround contribution limits including:

•

•

Out of District Contributions: One option is to limit individual contributions from
outside a candidate's electoral district, or to place aggregate limits on the amount a
candidate may accept from out-of-district contributors. Some commentators have
argued that this would disadvantage challengers, especially those in poorer districts,
who find it difficult to raise enough money to reach their constituents. Another
alternative is to allow larger or more contributions from within a district to provide a
partial local fundraising incentive. A similar proposal is to make in-district
contributions or lobbying expenses tax-deductible.
Off-Year Fundraising: A separate option is to restrict or prohibit candidates from
raising funds during non-election years and directly following an election. This could
partially remove the conduct of public business from the continual effort to raise
private funds during non-campaign periods of time. This proposal would probably
benefit challengers. (See pages 20 and 24).
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•

Cash on Hand: A final option is to restrict or prohibit candidates from carrying-over
campaign funds from one election to another. This could prevent public officials from
compiling large "war chests" to discourage potential opponents.

Expenditure Limits
Setting spending limit levels for statewide and state legislative candidates is a difficult task.
California cannot rely on measures adopted by other jurisdictions because of vast
differences in the size of representational districts, the degree of professionalization of
political institutions, the competitiveness of elections, and the cost of specialized campaign
activities (such as paid media and campaign consulting) which lead to tremendous
variation between states. For example, spending limits for gubernatorial candidates range
from $400,000 in Vermont to $5 million in Florida. Accounting for population does not
diminish the variation between states. Maryland limits gubernatorial candidates to
spending $.46 per registered voter for both elections combined while Rhode Island limits
candidates to $2.79 per registered voter per election.
Spending Limits Standards

Each of the following strategies presents an alternative approach to establishing
expenditure ceilings for state candidates in California.

Current Spending Patterns: One option is to base expenditure limits on current spending
patterns by candidates for state office in California. Levels could be based on the highest
spending races, the average spending race, the highest open seat race, or the average
open seat race. Spending by winning candidates in the previous election, adjusted for
inflation, could be used to generate such levels at the outset.
•

•

•

State Senate: The largest amount spent by a candidate in 1992 was $925,000 in a
primary election, $625,000 in a general election, and $1 million combined for both
elections. Median spending by Senate candidates was $250,000 in the primary
election, $300,000 in the general election, and $550,000 total for both elections.
State Assembly: The largest amount spent by a candidate in 1992 was $685,000 in a
primary election, $725,000 in a general election, and $865,000 combined for both
elections. Median spending by Assembly candidates was $200,000 in the primary
election, $250,000 in the general election, and $450,000 total for both elections.
Open Seat Elections: Because open seat elections tend to be highly competitive,
spending in those elections might provide a range for spending limits. The highest
spending candidate in 1992 Assembly open seat races spent approximately $300,000 in
the primary election, $525,000 in the general election, and $720,000 total for both
elections. The average spending by victorious open seat Assembly candidates was
$17 5, 000 for each the primary and general elections.

Spending per Capita/per Voter: Spending levels could be based on a given amount per
registered voter. This could be indexed according to population or voter registration in
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order to differentiate between districts and offices. For example, Senate incumbents spent
approximately $1.12 per capita and Senate non-incumbents spent $.13 per capita in 1992.
Assembly incumbents spent $1.45 per capita and Assembly non-incumbents spent $.26 per
capita. Per registered voter, Senate incumbents spent $2.60, Senate non-incumbents spent
$.30, Assembly incumbents spent $3.32, and Assembly non-incumbents spent $.60.
Spending Limit Adjustments

Regardless of how expenditure levels are established, they could be adjusted annually for
inflation, population growth, and/or average increases in the cost of media. They could
also be established on a per election (primary or general) or per election cycle (both
elections combined) basis.
Trigger Mechanisms

Expenditure limits must be accepted voluntarily by candidates in order to be constitutional
(See page 33 and Appendix A). Four mechanisms for triggering expenditure limits are
currently used in different jurisdictions. (See Chart 32 and 33, pages 48-52).

•

Public Funding: Candidates who voluntarily restrict their spending may receive public
funds. (See pages 36-43).
• Variable Contribution Limits: Candidates who agree to abide by voluntary
expenditure limits may raise money in larger amounts than candidates who do not
agree to the limits. This alternative might be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D).
• Entirely Voluntary Program: If a jurisdiction sets a voluntary expenditure limit
without providing public funds to candidates who agree to accept it, the program may
be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D).
• Waive Candidate Qualification Requirements: Filing fees or signature requirements
to appear on the ballot may be waived for candidates accepting voluntary spending
limits. This alternative might be unconstitutional. (See Appendix D).
• Tax Deductions: Contributions to candidates voluntarily limiting their spending may
be made tax-deductible up to a certain amount while contributions to non-participating
candidates would not be deductible. This alternative might be unconstitutional.
• Equal Time Provisions: Candidates spending above a specified amount may be
required to provide equal time to their opponent(s) on all paid voter contacts made
after the spending limit is surpassed. For example, once a candidate reaches the
spending ceiling, she may be required to equally share each television and radio
advertisement and direct mail piece with her opponent. This alternative appears to
comply with the intent of the Buckley decision. (See Appendix D).
Other Spending Limits

Other forms of campaign expenditures may also be limited in a voluntary system. Possible
alternatives including limiting the amount of money a candidate may contribute to his or
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her campaign, and/or limiting the amount of independent expenditures which may be made
on a candidate's behalf (See page 36). Some jurisdictions provide incentives such as:
•
•
•

Granting public subsidies to candidates whose opponents benefit from independent
expenditures or who spend more than a specified amount of their personal funds on
their campaigns;
Removing expenditure limits for candidates whose opponents fail to limit their use of
personal funds or benefit from independent expenditures; or
Requiring candidates who receive public funds to restrict their use of personal funds to
a specified amount.

Public Campaign Financing
Numerous jurisdictions provide public funds to candidates for political office. Public
financing systems vary in four ways: the breadth of the program, the qualifications for
receiving funds, the manner in which revenue is generated, and the manner in which
money is dispersed. (See page 38). The most difficult aspect of implementing a public
funding system is ensuring that public funds are used efficiently, and that fringe candidates
are not encouraged to seek elective office simply to gain access to public funds, and that
all viable candidates have the opportunity to receive public funds.

Qualifications
Various jurisdictions have adopted qualifications for candidates to receive public funds.

•
•
•
•
•

Fundraising: Candidates could be required to raise a threshold amount of money to
qualify for public funds, thereby demonstrating that they are viable candidates.
Signatures: Another alternative is to allow candidates to obtain a specified number of
voter signatures to qualify for public campaign financing.
Ballot Opposition: Most jurisdictions require candidates to be opposed on the ballot
in order for them to receive public funds.
Debates: Candidates receiving public funds could be required to engage in one or
more public debates prior to an election (as in Los Angeles).
Expenditure Vouchers: A final option is to require candidates to use public funds for a
specified purpose, such as voter contacts. For example, candidates could be given
vouchers for ten-minute television or radio commercials, or discounts on mailings.

Revenue Raising

Jurisdictions have generally experimented with three alternative mechanisms for generating
money to fund a public financing system. (See page 40).

•

Tax Check-Off Taxpayers could be allowed to earmark a small portion of their tax
liability to an election fund that provides public funds to candidates for state office.
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•
•

Tax Add-On: Taxpayers could be permitted to voluntarily increase their tax liability by
a specified amount and to earmark that sum for an election fund.
State General-Purpose Funds: Funds may be allocated annually from the State
General Fund to be dispersed to qualified candidates for political office.

Alternative Systems

Two alternatives to public financing systems might achieve similar results: voucher
systems, and tax-based financing systems.

Voucher Systems: Rather than simply limiting private contributions, a voucher system
would prohibit them entirely. Citizens would be issued government vouchers worth ten to
one hundred dollars that they could contribute to the candidates or committees of their
choice. Each citizen could be guaranteed an equal amount to contribute to candidates,
regardless of their income. Candidates would use these vouchers for all campaign
expenses. Vendors receiving vouchers would redeem them at face value from the state.
Independent expenditures and personal contributions from candidates, while impossible to
limit on constitutional grounds, would be disclosed by the administering agency.
Tax-Based Financing Systems: A tax-based financing system could be implemented to
encourage certain contributions and discourage others. For example, small contributions
from individuals could be tax deductible, while larger contributions could be taxed on a
progressive sliding scale. Either the contributor or the recipient could be liable for this tax
burden, with differing effects. Taxing contributors might provide powerful incentives and
disincentives for particular contributions and generate income for the state at the expense
of political candidates. Taxing recipients might reduce the amount of money candidates
have available to spend. A tax-based financing system probably would be most effective
as part of a comprehensive system in which public funds are re-distributed from this tax
pool to candidates who accept spending limits. If the state should ever begin taxing
services, these features may become part of that tax system.
Campaign Finance Disclosure and Electoral Information

Every state requires candidates for political office to disclose certain campaign finance
activities, and empowers a public agency to enforce disclosure provisions and report
pertinent information to the public. However, there is tremendous variation in disclosure
requirements. Campaign finance disclosure provisions differ in five ways: who is required
to file statements, when they must file statements, what these statements must contain,
how this information is made available to the public, and how campaign finance provisions
are enforced. (See page 46). Public access and enforcement are the most controversial
provisions.
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Public Access:
Research suggests that campaign finance data is not readily available to the California
public in an accessible format, although candidates and committees collect and file
relatively detailed statements. (See pages 4 and 46). Alternatives for improving public
access to campaign information include the following options:
•
•
•

•
•

Develop an on-line computer system for campaign finance data such as in place in
Washington. (See page 47).
Require more extensive reporting by candidates of the sources and recipients of
campaign funds, as well as the purpose of various expenditures.
Require the Secretary of State or the Fair Political Practices Commission to issue
periodic reports (available on the Internet and in hard copy) detailing the sources and
recipients of campaign funds by candidate such as in Los Angeles and New York City.
(See Appendix D).
Require candidates to file campaign finance information on computer disk or pay inlieu fees to cover the cost of data entry.
Develop voter pamphlets which would give more information on candidates including
statements and positions on issues as pioneered in New York City. (See Appendix A).

Enforcement:

Enhanced enforcement of the Political Reform Act (Title IX) could improve disclosure.
Options include:
•
•

Adopt stricter penalties and larger fines for violation of Title IX.
Increase Fair Political Practices Commission funding for the purposes of improving
investigations of possible disclosure and campaign violations, and for issuing regular
reports on candidate compliance with campaign finance provisions.
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APPENDIX A: ffiSTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM EFFORTS IN
CALIFORNIA SINCE 1974

Proposition 9
In the wake of the Watergate scandal, the California Legislature passed two significant
measures in 1973 that were designed to reform politics and campaigns in California. The
Waxman-Dymally Act required candidates to register their campaign committees with the
Secretary of State and to file campaign statements (at specified times before and after the
election) disclosing receipts and expenditures over $100. The Moscone Conflict of
Interest Act required public officials to disclose their financial and property interests.
Concurrently, a handful of political reform groups, including California Common Cause,
Ralph Nader's California Citizen Action Group, and People's Lobby, Inc. teamed with
then-Secretary of State Edmund G. Brown, Jr. to propose even more stringent reform
measures. The coalition drafted an initiative and gathered enough signatures to qualify it
for the June 1974 ballot as Proposition 9, The Political Reform Initiative.
Proposition 9 was the most comprehensive campaign and ethics reform package ever
proposed in California. It proposed to regulate numerous aspects of political campaigns
including campaign finance disclosure, limits on campaign spending, restrictions on the
actions of lobbyists, and safeguards against conflicts of interest. According to the
proponents of the measure, the Proposition 9 was designed to "put an end to corruption in
politics, and (make) politicians directly responsible to the people-not to purchased
demands of special interests." 104 Arguments in the voters' pamphlet asserted, "the impact
of Watergate and related events has obviously contributed to the serious decline of citizen
confidence in the governmental process; Proposition 9 will give citizens a basis for the
faith and trust which must lie at the heart of our political process. "tos
Proposition 9 was formally opposed by numerous business and labor groups, including the
AFL-CIO, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Bankers Association, and
the California Manufacturers Association. Opponents of the measure contended that,
"powerful interests do not dominate California elected officials. It is an over-kill attempt
to legislate honesty into political campaigns. This cannot be done; it is not needed. "106
California voters apparently did not agree and overwhelmingly approved Proposition 9
with nearly 70 percent support.
Proposition 9 included the following key provisions:
•

104
lOS
106

Required campaign committees receiving or spending $500 or more dollars to file a
statement of organization with the Secretary of State and to file periodic reports
detailing financial activities.
California Secretary of State, June 4, 1974.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

Required these campaign finance reports to identify all contributors of $50 or more
and each person or corporation to whom an expenditure of $50 or more was made.
Limited candidates for Governor to spending no more than seven cents per voting-age
citizen in primary elections and nine cents in general elections. Limited candidates for
other statewide offices to spending three cents in both the primary and general
elections. Incumbents seeking re-election were prohibited from spending more than
90 percent of the applicable spending limit placed on their challengers.
Required lobbyists to register with the Secretary of State.
Required lobbyists to report periodically all payments received for their lobbying
activities and to report all lobbying expenses, including an itemized list of any activity
that would benefit public officials, candidates, or their families.
Prohibited lobbyists from spending more than $10 per month on a single public official
and from arranging or making campaign contributions to both public officials and
candidates.
Required public officials to report all financial holdings that might be affected by their
actions as officeholders, and were disqualified from participating in the decisionmaking process surrounding those issues.
Required the Secretary of State to send a ballot pamphlet to all voters prior to each
election detailing provisions of all measures up for a vote and offering arguments for
and against each measure as presented by the Legislative Analyst.
Created the five member Fair Political Practices Commission with a mandated annual
appropriation of $1 million to enforce the act and establish penalties for noncompliance.

Just after California approved Proposition 9, the United States Congress passed The
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, "the most sweeping federal
campaign reform law in history. "107 The Act enacted the following key provisions:
•
•
•
•
•

Established contribution limits to candidates for federal offices ($1, 000 for individuals
and $5,000 for political committees, the total of which could not exceed $25,000);
Prohibited independent expenditures above $1, 000;
Limited the amount of personal or family money a candidate could spend on his or her
own campaign to specified amounts depending on the office being sought;
Restricted overall general election and primary campaign expenditures by candidates
to specific amounts depending on the office being sought; and,
Created strict campaign finance reporting requirements for donations and expenditures
over $100.

The United States Supreme Court's landmark 1975 decision in Buckley v. Valeo
invalidated many provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act:
•
· 107
108

The Court ruled that while political contributions represent "speech by proxy," 108
contribution limits "are appropriate legislative weapons against the reality or
Alexander, 1991.
Buckley v. Valeo, 1976
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•
•

appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on
large campaign contributions, and ceilings imposed serve the basic governmental
interest in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly impinging
on the rights of individual citizens and candidates to engage in political debate and
discussion." 109 Contribution limits whose purpose is to prevent governmental
corruption represent the "single exception to the rule that limits on political activity
(are) contrary to the First Amendment."llO
The Court found that campaign finance disclosure provisions are generally
constitutional because they "serve substantial governmental interests in informing the
electorate and preventing the corruption of the political process." 111
Conversely, the court ruled that the independent expenditure ceilings, limits on
candidates expending personal funds on their campaigns, and overall campaign
expenditure limits are unconstitutional because "those provisions place substantial
and direct restrictions on the ability of candidates, citizens, and association to engage
in protected political expression." 112 While limits on contributions "involve little direct
restraint on... political communication," expenditure limits place "substantial restraints
on the quality and diversity of political speech, the quantity of expression by restricting
the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the
audience reached" 113 The Court ruled that for expenditure limits to be constitutional,
they must be voluntarily accepted and combined with some form of public financing.
Since the federal legislation did not enact public financing of campaigns, expenditure
limits were declared void.

Although the Buckley decision specifically addressed the Federal Election Campaign Act
Amendments of 1974, the ruling applied to state laws as well. In April of 1976, the
California Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Buckley to Proposition 9 in its ruling in
Citizens for Jobs and Energy v. FPPC. The Court found the expenditure limits enacted
by Proposition 9 to be unconstitutional. At the same time, a series of lawsuits brought by
the California Bankers Association and the Institute of Governmental Advocates
challenged Proposition 9's restrictive lobbying provisions. The Court affirmed disclosure
provisions and the $10 per month limit on expenditures for public officials. However, in
FPPC v. Superior Court (/GA), the Court invalidated the ban on direct contributions by
lobbyists to candidates 114 and the requirement that lobbyists make itemized monthly
reports on the value of transactions with public officials. During the 1977 legislative
session, the Legislature officially repealed the provisions ruled unconstitutional to comply
with the rulings.

1091bid.
110

Ibid.

111
112

Citizens Against Rent Control v. City ofBerkeley, 1981
Buckley v. Valeo, 1976

113

Ibid.

114

The FPPC had interpreted this to mean a prohibition on lobbyists arranging contributions from their
employers.
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Legislative Reform Proposals (1976-1984)
In the immediate aftermath of court rulings, the State Legislature considered legislation to
enact various Proposition 9 reforms in a constitutionally acceptable format. Two
measures debated at the end ofthe 1975-76 general session were designed to save the
expenditure limits in Proposition 9. Since expenditure limits are constitutionally
acceptable only if accompanied by a system of public financing, both AB 466 (Goggin)
and AB 2817 (Keysor) proposed a system of public financing for statewide elections.
Neither bill defined the manner in which public money would be granted to political
candidates; neither was enacted.
The Legislature again considered a number of campaign finance measures during the
1977-1978 legislative session. The most comprehensive ofthese measures, AB 1372
(Fazio) proposed a system of campaign financing that included contribution limits,
expenditure limits, and the public funding of campaigns. Fazio's bill limited contributions
by individuals to $500 and by political committees to $1,500. In order to qualify for state
matching funds at a rate of 3 to I, candidates had to voluntarily agree to donate no more
than $20,000 oftheir own funds for statewide races or $10,000 for state legislative races.
In addition, candidates had to abide by strict spending limits based on the office being
sought and the number of eligible voters residing in the district. Assembly candidates
were allowed to spend up to twenty-two cents per eligible voter and State Senate
candidates were allowed up to fifteen cents. Statewide candidates were allowed between
two cents and seven cents depending on the office. The bill passed the Assembly
Elections and Reapportionment Committee but was defeated by the Assembly Ways and
Means Committee.
During the 1979-1980 general session, the Legislature again considered a number of
campaign finance proposals. AB 2927 (Hart) proposed a comprehensive system of
campaign finance for state legislative campaigns. The bill established political party
contribution limits of up to $15,000 for Assembly candidates and $25,000 for Senate
candidates, and limited individual contributions to $500 and political committee
contributions to $1,500. A unique provision allowed Assembly candidates to transfer no
more than $20,000 from their primary election fund to their general election campaign; the
limit was $30,000 for Senate candidates. At the center of the proposal were strict
voluntary expenditure limits and a limitation on the amount of personal money candidates
could spend on their own campaigns. In exchange for agreeing to these voluntary limits,
candidates representing political parties with at least 25% registration in the district would
receive a lump sum payment of$10,000 for State Assembly candidates and $15,000 for
State Senate candidates. In addition, candidates would receive 3 to 1 public matching
funds. The bill was passed by the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee
but never reached the Floor.
During the 1981-1982 session, the Assembly again considered legislation to establish a
system of campaign finance. AB 2193 (Harris), which resembled AB 2927 (hart) from the
previous term, reached the floor of the Assembly before falling short of the necessary 2/3
CRB-IS-006
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vote, 45-17. Another comprehensive proposal, AB 3385 (Vasconcellos and Willie
Brown) proposed contribution limits, expenditure limits, and 1 to 1 public matching funds.
The bill required all candidates applying to receive public matching funds to limit
campaign expenditures to $130,000 for Assembly races and $260,000 for Senate races,
and to limit spending of their personal funds to $10,000 in Assembly races and $20,00 in
Senate races. AB 3385 failed in the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee.
Rapidly escalating campaign spending in the 1982 elections and increased pressure from
the media and public interest groups raised the prominence and visibility of campaign
reform in the 1983-1984 legislative session. In all, over twenty-three separate
comprehensive campaign financing schemes were introduced in the Legislature. Of these,
four passed their house of origin and two, AB 12 (Vasconcellos) and AB 311 (Connelly)
were sent to a conference committee. The Vasconcellos proposal was similar to his AB
3385 a session earlier except that it allowed candidates to spend slightly more money and
contained a unique provision benefiting candidates facing wealthy opponents who refuse
to limit their personal expenditures. In an attempt to even the playing field, the individual
opposing a wealthy candidate who spends unlimited personal funds would be allowed to
double his or her campaign expenditures and receive up to 2/3 of the limits in 2 to 1
matching funds. ($200,000 for the Assembly and $400,000 for the Senate). The
conference committee was unable to report out AB 12.
Assembly Member Connelly's AB 311 proposed a comprehensive campaign finance
system: limits on contributions, expenditure limits, restrictions on the use of personal
funds, and public matching funds. In addition, it prohibited the transfer of funds between
candidates' campaign committees. The conference committee added a provision that tied
the bill to the passage of Proposition 40. If Proposition 40 garnered majority approval,
AB 311 would supersede it~ if the initiative failed, neither measure would be enacted.
The bill was passed by the Legislature but Governor George Deukmejian vetoed it, citing
his opposition to the public financing provisions.
Proposition 40 (1984)
In the spring of 1984, Assembly Member Ross Johnson had unveiled an initiative proposal
to "dramatically reform the way campaigns for state office are financed." Assembly
Member Johnson argued that his proposal, Proposition 40, The Fair Campaign Finance
Amendments to the Political Reform Act, would correct a system dominated by the
"scramble for the almighty tax dollar (by) placing reasonable limits on contributions."tts
Proposition 40 prohibited contributions from corporations, labor unions, and transfers
from other candidates. Only political action committees, parties, and individuals would be
allowed to donate, and their donations would be limited to $1000 per candidate per fiscal
year. Individuals were further prohibited from contributing more than $250 to political
parties and political committees. The measure prohibited all anonymous and cash
contributions and required candidates to file declarations of their candidacy prior to
liS

Fair Political Practices Commission, 1984.
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soliciting or receiving any campaign funds. A minor, yet controversial, provision provided
limited public funds to candidates facing wealthy candidates. In order to discourage the
use of personal money, a candidate would receive one dollar in public money for every
dollar his or her opponent spent of personal funds, up to one million dollars.
Johnson argued that the measure would limit the amount of money in political campaigns,
help control the power of special interests, and provide for more competitive elections.
Opponents, including political parties, assorted labor and business groups, and California
Common Cause, raised objections, claiming that the proposal would limit the ability of
challengers to raise enough money to successfully campaign against incumbents. 116
Further, the FPPC warned that the measure would actually increase the relative
importance of PAC contributions from approximately 1/3 to 112 of all campaign funds as
other forms of contributions were limited or prohibited.1 17 Proposition 40 was defeated in
the November 1984 General Election by a 65 percent to 35 percent margin.
Legislative Reform Proposals (1985-1988)

After the defeat of Proposition 40, over thirty different comprehensive reform proposals
were considered in the next two legislative sessions. Although the proposals received
varying levels of support and achieved varying degrees of success, none of the measures
were sent to the Governor. Senator Bill Lockyer's SB 90 was one of the more promising
measures. Under its provisions, candidates for state legislative office would face either
strict contribution or expenditure limits. At a specified time before an election, candidates
would be required to choose to accept either contribution limits ($1,000 from individuals,
$3,000 from PACs, and $5,000 from political parties) or expenditure limits ($230,000 for
Senate candidates for the primary and $405,000 for the general election, and $115,000 for
Assembly candidates for the primary and $230,000 for the general election). In exchange
for accepting expenditure limits, candidates would receive public matching funds from a
Legislative Elections Fund. Taxpayers could transfer up to five dollars of their income
taxes to the Fund by checking off a box on their tax forms. Nominees for legislative
offices would have to reach specified fundraising thresholds in order to become eligible for
public funds. Interestingly, the bill also proposed contribution limits for candidates for
local offices. The measure paSsed the State Senate by a vote of 22-10, but was never
considered by the Assembly. Senator Lockyer's subsequent measure, SB 111, faced a
similar fate during the following session.
Assembly Member Filante proposed a unique alternative form of public financing in 1985.
In order to persuade candidates to accept voluntary expenditure limits, Filante's AB 4358
established a system of tax credits for small political contributors. The measure granted a
50% tax credit to individuals contributing $100 or less to a candidate vying for office in
their district and who agreed to expenditure limits. All other political contributions were
not tax deductible. The proposal was defeated by the Assembly Ways and Means
Committee.
11 6

California Common Cause, 1984.

11 7 Fair Political Practices Commission, 1984.
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In 1987, Assembly Member Jackie Speier introduced AB 2051 to institute a system of
public financing of campaigns, combined with contribution limits, voluntary expenditure
limits, prohibitions on the transfer of campaign funds, and limits on the receipt of gifts and.
honoraria that Members of the Legislature and candidates for elective office could receive.
Public funds would be available to candidates on a matching fund basis. Political
contributions would no longer be tax deductible and taxpayers would instead have the
ability to add up to $3 to their tax liability to be deposited into a state political campaign
fund. AB 2051 was defeated in the Assembly Elections and Reapportionment Committee.
Senator Milton Marks introduced SCA 34 which called on the Legislature to enact limits
on the source and amount of political contributions, prohibit the transfer of campaign
funds, and provide public funding for candidates accepting expenditure limits. A fund
would be created through either a voluntary "add-on" or "check-off' system. Unlike other
proposals, details of the system were intentionally left out of the legislation. Rather, the
purpose of the constitutional amendment was to have the public ratify the general
framework of a comprehensive reform system while leaving the details to future legislative
consideration. SCA 34 was defeated by the Senate Appropriations Committee.
Propositions 68 and 73 (1988)
In 1984, the California Commission on Campaign Financing was created to examine the

exploding cost of political campaigns in California. The Commission, a non-partisan, nonprofit organization, contained prominent members of the business community, labor
leaders, legal experts, and academics. The first Commission report, The New Gold Rush:
Financing California's Legislative Campaigns, focused on problems in campaign
financing and issued a series of recommendations for reform including a model law for
state legislative campaigns. Bolstered by business support for the proposal, members of
the Commission decided to sponsor an initiative and place the proposal on the ballot. The
measure was placed on the June 1988 primary ballot as Proposition 68. Proposition 68
was directed only at state legislative elections. It contained the following key provisions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Limited contributions by individuals to candidates to $1,000 or less per candidate and
a total of$25,000 per election.
Limited contributions by political committees to $2,500 or less per candidate and a
total of$200,000 per election.
Limited contributions by "small contributor" political committees (P ACs that accept
no contributions over $50) to $5,000 or less per candidate per election.
Prohibited non-election year contributions.
Prohibited Assembly candidates from accepting $50,000 or more from PACs and
Senate candidate from accepting $75,000 or more from PACs.
Limited political parties to contributing $50,000 to an Assembly candidate and
$75,000 to a Senate candidate.
Prohibited transfers of funds between candidates.
Established a system of public funding based on a taxpayer "check-off' system.
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•
•
•

Required candidates receiving public funds to collect a minimum amount of private
money, be opposed by a candidate who had collected at least $35,000, and voluntarily
limit campaign spending and personal money expenditures.
Matched contributions of $250 or less from voters in the candidate's district on a 5 to
I ratio. Matched all other contributions on a 3 to I ratio.
Limited Assembly candidates to spending $I50,000 for a primary election and
$225,000 for a general election. For Senate candidates, limits were $250,000 for a
primary election and $350,000 for a general election.

Three Legislators (Assembly Member Ross Johnson and Senators Montoya and Kopp)
drafted a counter-initiative similar to Proposition 40, and qualified it for the ballot, where
it was designated Proposition 73. Proposition 73 contained both campaign finance and
ethics reform provisions for both legislative offices and statewide offices. Its most striking
distinction from Proposition 68 was its ban on public financing for all political campaigns
in California.
Proposition 73 contained the following provisions:
•
•
•
•
•

Limited contributions from individuals to SI,OOO per candidate per fiscal year; limited
political committee contributions to $2,500; and limited broad-based political
committees and political party contributions to $5,000.
Prohibited transfers of funds between candidates.
Restricted gifts and honoraria for elected officials.
Prohibited candidates for public office from receiving public campaign funds.
Banned publicly funded newsletters and mass mailings.

As voters waded through the conflicting arguments of the Proposition 68 and Proposition
73 supporters, they were also confronted by a third group that opposed both sets of
reform. The "No-No campaign" was lead by Assembly Speaker Willie Brown and Senate
Majority Leader David Roberti and spent $1.3 million. 118 Adding to the confusion was
the presence of other complex and competing issues on the ballot, including auto
insurance reform.
Proposition 68 passed by a margin of 53 percent to 47 percent. Surprisingly, Proposition
73, whose supporters spent just $30,000 on the campaign, passed by a vote of 58 percent
to 42 percent. Thus, during the same election, California voters both approved and
disapproved the public financing of political campaigns. The passage of the two
conflicting measures resulted in over five years of legal battles and court rulings and, some
analysts contend, a disappointed and disillusioned electorate.
The California Constitution specifies that, "if the provision of two or more measures
approved at the same election conflict, those of the measure receiving the highest
affirmative vote shall prevail. "11 9 Advocates of Proposition 73 claimed that it should be
. 118Jbid.
119 California Constitution Article II Section IO(b).

CRB-IS-006
July, 1994

Page AS

adopted in full and invalidate all of Proposition 68. Supporters of Proposition 68
countered that nearly thirty separate provisions of the initiative did not directly conflict
and should therefore become law. The Fair Political PractiCes Commission attempted to
sort out the separate provisions. However, supporters of Proposition 68 mounted a legal
challenge against the FPPC. The California Supreme Court ruled in Taxpayers to Limit
Campaign Spending v. FPPC that "because the two schemes were presented to the voters
as alternative, competing measures, only Proposition 73, which received the higher
number of affirmative votes, was effective... and that Proposition 68 was inoperative. "12°
While this ruling apparently sealed the fate of Proposition 68, the legal battles surrounding
Proposition 73 continued. The next round of court rulings began when a number of
opponents ofProposition 73 challenged the constitutionality of its contribution limit
provisions. In Service Employees International Union v. FPPC, a federal district court
found that because the contribution limits were based on fiscal years, rather than election
cycles, they "unconstitutionally discriminate in favor of incumbents and their supporters
and against challengers and their supporters." 121 Citing the Supreme Court decision in
Buckley, the court also found the ban on the transfer of funds to be an unconstitutional
expenditure limitation. The court did, however, suggest that a more narrowly defined
restriction on transfers might be constitutionally acceptable. The ruling applied only to
general and primary elections: the contribution limits and the ban on transfers of funds
were retained for special elections. Other sections of the initiative remained in force.
Rather than disrupt campaigns already in progress, the court ruled that disputed the
Proposition 73 limits would remain in force for state legislative candidates until the end of
the 1990 election cycles. A report by California Common Cause found that fundraising by
state legislative candidates decreased markedly under Proposition 73. Legislative
candidates raised $79 million in 1988, only $52 million in 1990, and $72 million in
1992. 122 However, the ratio by which incumbents were able to outraise and outspend
challengers increased dramatically in 1990. In 1988 and 1992, incumbents outraised their
opponents by five to one. In 1990, under Proposition 73, incumbents held an eight to one
advantage in fundraising.1 23 This seems to support the Court's reasoning.
Once Proposition 73's key provisions were declared unconstitutional, proponents of
Proposition 68 moved to have it re-activated. They argued that because the contribution
limits were invalidated for primary and general elections, "the remaining parts of
Proposition 73 are likewise unenforceable because they are nonseverable from the invalid
portions of the measure." 124 The California Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that the
"claim must fail if any substantial part of Proposition 73 survives." Since the ban on
publicly funded mass mailings in Proposition 73 "was a substantial feature of the

120
121

Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. FPPC 1990.
Service Employees International Union v. FPPC 1990.

122 California Common Cause,
123Jbid.
124

1993.

Walter Gerken, eta/. v. Fair Political Practices Commission, 1993.
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initiative," it prevented the re-institution of Proposition 68.12s In a sharply worded
dissent, Justice Arabian argued that "the overriding objective of the voters who supported
the measure cannot be achieved. "126 He asserted that voters approved of both measures in
order to ensure that one or the other would be adopted. Instead, only minimal aspects of
one initiative have actually taken effect.
In March 1994 Senator Quentin Kopp and Assembly Member Ross Johnson petitioned the
California Supreme Court to remedy the portions of Proposition 73 declared
unconstitutional by the federal court by judicially changing the construction of
contribution limits from a fiscal year to an election cycle basis. Although several justices
appear to have encouraged this action, it remains unclear whether the court will revive the
measure. A court decision is expected in August.
Proposition 131 (1990)
In 1990, Attorney General John Van de Kamp proposed the third campaign finance
initiative submitted to the voters in two years. With the support of Ralph Nader and
California Common Cause, Van de Kamp crafted an initiative addressing numerous
aspects of political reform. It became an integral part of his gubernatorial campaign. The
measure, whose campaign finance provisions resembled Proposition 68, qualified for the
November 1990 ballot and was designated as Proposition 131, the "Clean Government
Initiative." It contained the following provisions:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Term Limits. Elected statewide officials were limited to eight successive years in
office and state legislators to twelve successive years.
Limited on gifts and honoraria for public officials.
Limited contributions from individuals to $1,000 per candidate per election cycle.
Limited political committees to $2,500 per candidate, and broad-based political
committees to $10,000. Political parties were prohibited from contributing more than
116 of the applicable spending limit for the particular office being sought.
Prohibited non-election year contributions.
Required candidates to raise two-thirds of all contributions from individuals.
Limited Assembly candidates to spending $250,000 for a primary election and
$400,000 for a general election. For Senate candidates, the limits were $425,000 for a
primary election and $700,000 for a general election.
Public funds were to be provided by both General Fund appropriations and an income
tax check-off program.

Proposition 131 was defeated by a wide margin, 38% to 62%.

m Ibid.
126

Ibid.
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Legislative Reform Proposals (1989-1992)
In the three legislative sessions since the passage of Propositions 68 and 73, the California

Legislature has considered over forty separate campaign finance measures. None have
passed and gone to the Governor. It has proved difficult to build a political coalition able
to pass a comprehensive reform plan, particularly since a 213 vote is required to amend the
Political Reform Act, unless changes are approved by the electorate. In 1992, two
competing campaign finance reform measures were introduced: AB 2328, which was
sponsored by thirteen Republican Members, and AB 2951, which was sponsored by five
Democrats.
•

•

The Republican bill, AB 2328, was designed to simultaneously repeal and re-write the
provisions of Proposition 73 that were ruled unconstitutional by the federal district
court. The measure re-instated the Proposition 73 contribution limits but enforced
them on an election cycle basis rather than a fiscal year basis. The bill also re-stated
provisions prohibiting the use of public money for political campaigns and on mailing
newsletters at public expense. The bill was defeated in committee.
The Democratic measure, AB 2951, also repealed provisions ofProposition 73, and
created a complex comprehensive system of contribution limits, voluntary expenditure
limits, and public financing. Contributions: The bill limited individual contributions to
$1,000 per candidate per election. For political committees and small contributor
political committees the limits were $2,500 and $5,000, respectively. Transfers of
funds between candidates were prohibited and the total amount a candidate may raise
from non-individuals was limited to 1/3 of the expenditure limits and from political
parties to 1/6 of the expenditure limits. Spending Limits: To receive public funds,
candidates had to agree to limit their spending. to $200,000 in the primary and
$250,000 in the general election for Assembly candidates, $350,000 in the primary and
$450,000 in the general election for Senate candidates, $1.3 million in the primary and
$2.4 million in the general election for all statewide officials (other than Governor),
and $4.5 million in the primary and $7.2 million in the general election for candidates
for Governor. Candidates had to limit their personal expenditures to between $25,000
and $100,000, depending on the office being sought. The bill contained a unique
provision regarding independent expenditures. Candidates whose opponents had
independent expenditures in excess of 1/6 of the spending limit made on their behalf
could have their spending limits increased by that amount. Matching Funds: The bill
established a system of 1 to 1 public matching funds for the first $250 of each
contribution. The bill also established some unique disclosure provisions. The
measure was defeated despite receiving a simple majority in the Assembly, 42-33.

Even had it passed, AB 2951 would have taken effect only ifSCA 4 (Keene) had been
passed by the Legislature and ratified by the voters. SCA 4 amended Article II of the
California Constitution to require the Legislature to institute a system of comprehensive
campaign financing including contribution and expenditure limits, limited public matching
funds, and a prohibition on the transfer of campaign funds between candidates. The
measure passed the Senate on a 28-6 vote, but was defeated 35-37 in the Assembly.
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APPENDIX B: CURRENT SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE POLIDCAL
REFORM ACT
Disclosure Provisions:

•
•
•
•

Candidates, elected officers, and political committees are required to file semi-annual
statements and two pre-election statements as specified before each primary and
general election.
Ballot measure committees are required to file semi-annual statements and two
statements prior to the election the measure appears on the ballot.
Candidates, elected officers, political committees, and ballot measure committees are
required to report all contributions of $100 or more and the sum of all contributions
under $100.
Any individual or committee making independent expenditures which total $500 or
more must issue semi-annual reports which include detailed information for all
expenditures in excess of$100.

Campaign Finance Provisions:

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Individuals, political committees, and political parties may make unlimited
contributions to candidates for primary and general elections, political committees, and
political parties.
Candidates in primary, general, and special elections may make unlimited expenditures.
Candidates, elected public officials, and their campaign committees may make
unlimited transfers of funds to other candidates, elected public officials, and campaign
committees.
Candidates, elected officials, political committees, and political parties may accept an
unlimited amount and number of contributions during non-election years.
Candidates may carry-over an unlimited amount of campaign funds from one election
to another, and from one year to another.
Candidates for public office may expend an unlimited amount of their personal or
family funds on their own campaigns.
Individuals, political co111I'iuttees, and broad based political committees may make an
unlimited number and amount of independent expenditures on behalf of candidates,
political parties, ballot measures, or for other purposes.
Contributions to, and expenditures by, ballot measure campaigns are unlimited.
Special Elections: Individuals may contribute up to $1,000 per candidate; political
committees may contribute a total of $2,500 or less; and broad based political
committees may contribute up to a total of$5,000.
Candidates for public office are prohibited from accepting or expending public moneys
for their campaigns.
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APPENDIX C: SELECTED CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION
INTRODUCED IN mE 1993-94 REGULAR SESSION*
Contribution Limits Legislation:
SB 1693 (Campbell)

SB 1693 would establish the most strict contribution limitations in the nation. The bill
would prohibit candidates from soliciting or accepting any contribution for an election
campaign in excess of $10, unless the contributor resides in the district of the office to
which the candidate is seeking election. Constituent contributors may contribute up to
$250. SB 1693 was defeated by the Senate Committee on Elections and
Reapportionment.
SB 1897 (Hayden)

SB 1897 would prohibit any individual appointed to a board or commission by the
Governor, Speaker of the Assembly, or the Senate Committee on Rules from soliciting
contributions from anyone with business before that board or commission. Appointed
officials would also be prohibited from engaging in fundraising activities which would
benefit the appointing public official or committee member. SB 1897 was defeated by the
Senate.
AB 569 and ACA 4 (Friedman)

These companion measures would limit off-year fundraising by all legislative and statewide
candidates. Candidates would be prohibited from soliciting or receiving funds prior to
October 1 for legislative candidates and July 1 for statewide candidates in the year before
they seek election. The legislation would also lengthen the terms ofMembers of the
Assembly from two to four years. Both bills were defeated by the Assembly Committee
on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments.
AB 1343 (Johnson)

AB 1343, is nearly identical to the provisions of AB 2328, introduced by Assembly
Member Johnson in 1992 (See pg. All for discussion). AB 1343 was defeated by the
Assembly Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments.
AB 1761 (Frazee)

AB 1761 would prohibit political committees from making contributions to candidates for
public office or making independent expenditures on their behalf. The legislation would
restrict contributions from individuals to $1,000 per candidate and $1,000 per political
party. Only individuals would be allowed to contribute to political parties. Political
• Note: Bill descriptions and status are current as of July 1, 1994.
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parties would be restricted to contributing $5,000 to candidates for the Assembly, $10,000
to candidates for the Senate, $50,000 to candidates for the Board of Equalization, and
$100,000 to all other statewide candidates. AB 1761 was referred to the Assembly
Committee on Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments, where no
action has been taken.
AB 1993 (Bowen)

AB 1993 would repeal all ofProposition 73, save the ban on publicly-funded mass
mailings, and would establish individual contribution limits of$1,000 to candidates,
committees, or political parties; $2,500 limits for political committees; and $5,000 limits
for small contributor committees. The bill would limit the aggregate amounts which
individuals, political committees, and small contributor committees may contribute in one
two-year election cycle. Transfers between candidates, and non-election year fundraising
would be prohibited. AB 1993 would also increase funding for the FPPC, and increase
the maximum penalties for violations of Title IX from $2000 to $5,000 per violation.
Detailed requirements are specified for the use of surplus campaign funds officeholder
accounts. Independent expenditures by individuals or committees on behalf of candidates
would be prohibited once an individual or committee has donated $500 or more to that
candidate. AB 1993 was defeated by the Assembly Committee on Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments.
AB 3224 (Jones)

AB 3224 would repeal provisions of Proposition 73 declared unconstitutional by the
federal courts, limit contributions by political parties to $5,000 and prohibit transfers of
funds between candidates. The legislation would also prohibit all anonymous or cash
contributions and off-year fundraising. AB 3224 was defeated by the Assembly Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee by a 2-3 vote.
ACA 41 (McPherson)

ACA 41 is a statutory initiative requiring a 2/3 Legislative vote to be placed on the next
statewide ballot. It would establish a campaign finance system including the following
provisions: contribution limits; prohibitions on corporate and labor union contributions; a
prohibition on public financing of state elections; and restrictions on the transfer of
campaign funds. The contribution limits would be set at $1,000 per year from individuals,
$2,500 per election cycle from political committees, and $5,000 per election cycle from
broad-based political committees. ACA 41 is currently under consideration by the
Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee.
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Expenditure Limits/Public Funding Legislation:
AB 3631 (Karnette)

AB 3631 addresses the current tax check-off system, including the California Election
Campaign Fund which provides public money to political parties. This legislation would
repeal all of the ten programs listed on tax returns which receive less than $100,000 in
1996. If current check-off trends continue, the California Election Campaign Fund would
probably gamer that amount of money. The legislation was passed by the Assembly
Committee on Revenue and Taxation and is under consideration by the Assembly Ways
and Means Committee.
AC4 39 (Jones)

ACA 39 would prohibit a county or city charter from authorizing the expenditure of public
funds for political campaigns within their jurisdictions. The legislation is currently being
considered by the Assembly Committee on Local Government.
Comprehensive Legislation-(Includes Contribution Limits, Expenditure Limits, and
Public Financing)
SB 588 (Lockyer) and SC4 14 (Marks)

SB 588, and its companion measure, SCA 14, proposed a system of comprehensive
campaign finance for state legislative offices which includes contribution limits,
expenditure limitations, public financing, and restrictions on independent expenditures.
SCA 14 would have required the Legislature and Governor to establish such a system on
or before December 31, 1995, but it was defeated in the Senate. SB 588 was then
amended and is now a statutory initiative to be placed on the next statewide ballot for
ratification if enacted. SB 588 has passed the Senate and is now on the Assembly floor.
Contribution Limits:
• SB 588 limits contributions from qualified organizations to $5,000 per state legislative
candidate per election and from political parties to 1/3 of the applicable spending limit.
All other contributions would be limited to $2,000.
• State legislative candidates would be allowed to raise up to $20,000 (for Assembly
candidates) or $40,000 (for Senate candidates) in "seed money" which would not be
subject to the limitations.
• The bill prohibits transfers between candidates.
Matching Public Funds and Expenditure Limits:
• In order to receive public matching funds, candidates would have to raise a specified
amount of money, be opposed on the ballot, and agree to abide by expenditure limits
based on the average number of registered voters per district in California.
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•
•
•
•

Assembly candidates could spend no more than $1.75 per registered voter for the
general election. Senate candidates would be limited to $1.50 for the general election.
Public funds for qualifYing candidates would be provided through a tax check-off
system for the general election only.
Contributions would be matched 4 to 1 for the first $1 00, 3 to 1 for any amount
between $101 and $500, and 2 to 1 for any amount between $501 and $1,000.
Independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate by anyone contributing more than
$100 to that candidate would be prohibited.

SB 878 (Hayden)

SB 878 would create a very stringent comprehensive campaign financing system. The bill
would prohibit all political contributions in excess of$100. Candidates would be eligible
to receive matching funds in exchange for agreeing to abide by expenditure limits. The
limits would be set at the following levels: for Assembly candidates, $100,000 for the
primary election and $150,000 for the general election; for Senate candidates, $150,000
for the primary election and $225,000 for the general election; for Gubernatorial
candidates, $1 million for the primary election and $1.8 million for the general election; for
all other statewide offices, $250,000 for the primary election and $450,000 for the general
election. The Legislature would appropriate $5 million of State General Funds to finance
the matching funds program. SB 878 is in the Senate Committee on Elections and
Reapportionment.
SCA JJ (Lockyer)

SCA 13 would add Section 21 to Article II of the California Constitution requiring the
Legislature to enact a system of campaign financing prior to 1995 which would contain:
contribution limits, expenditure limitations, and partial public funding for state legislative
candidates. The bill differs from SCA 14 (Marks) because it also requires the Legislature
to establish provisions governing the use of non-campaign officeholder expense accounts
and to set contribution limits for local officials. The bill is in the Senate Committee on
Elections and Reapportionment.
SCA 21 (Hayden)

SCA 21 would add sections to Article II of the California Constitution. It would prohibit
candidates for state office from accepting campaign contributions in excess of$1,000 from
individuals, $2,500 from political committees, and $5,000 from small contributor
committees. The bill would prohibit candidates from soliciting or accepting contributions
before October 1 of the year prior to that in which the candidate is seeking election. The
transfer of funds to other candidates or campaign committees would be prohibited. The
legislation requires the creation of a public matching funds program whereby the first $250
of contributions would be matched. To receive matching funds, candidates would have to
agree to expenditure limits set at varied rates depending on the office being sought. SCA
21 is in the Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment.
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AB 3694 (Bowen)

AB 3694, which would be placed on the ballot as a statutory initiative, is similar to AB
1993, also introduced by Assembly Member Bowen. The two bills differ in one respect.
AB 3694 would create a Legislative Election Fund paid for with income tax check-offs
which would provide public funds to qualified candidates facing wealthy opponents.
Candidates would be eligible to receive one dollar for ever dollar in personal money spent
by his or her opponent. AB 3694 was defeated by the Assembly Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee.

A CA 12 (Sher)
ACA 12 would amend Article N of the California Constitution to require the California
Legislature and Governor to enact a system of campaign financing which would include
contribution limits, expenditure limitations, restrictions on the transfer of funds, and
limited public financing. The bill passed the Assembly Committee on Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments, and is currently in the Assembly
inactive file.
Campaign Disclosure Legislation:
SB 758 (Hayden)

SB 758 would require any committee receiving contributions or making campaign
expenditures totaling $30,000 or more, to file their campaign disclosure statements on
computer diskette as well as hard copy. The Secretary of State would be required to
establish a system whereby all campaign contribution records would be recorded in a
computer database and made electronically available to the public through the Internet and
through traditional print methods by January 1996. The information would be available to
any individual with access to a computer bulletin board or through public libraries. SB
758 was passed by the Senate but was defeated in the Assembly Elections,
Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee.
AB 2052 (Margolin)

AB 2052 would broaden disclosure requirements for political committees. Currently, the
Political Reform Act requires all committees making campaign contributions or
independent expenditures to file periodic campaign statements. This bill would similarly
require political committees to disclose payments to slate mailer organizations. AB 2052
was passed by the Assembly and is currently in the Senate inactive file.
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AB 2220 (Martinez)

AB 2220 would increase the maximum monetary penalty for violation of the Political
Reform Act from $2,000 to $4,000. This bill has been passed by the Assembly and is
being considered by the Senate Elections and Reapportionment Committee.
AB 2SOJ (Bowler, Conroy, Honeycutt, and Richter)

AB 2503 would require a candidate or committee which makes a late campaign
contribution or late independent expenditure to include in their late contribution report the
date and amount of that contribution along with the cumulative amount 'Contributed to or
spent on behalf of the recipient candidate or ballot committee. AB 2503 passed the
Assembly but was defeated by the Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment.
AB 2504 (Bowler)

AB 2504 would require candidates or campaign committees to return any contribution of
$500 or more which does not specify the occupation and employer of the contributor. AB
2504 was defeated 3-3 by the Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional
Amendments Committee.
AB Jl81 (Costa)

AB 3181 amends the system for qualifYing initiatives for the ballot. It also requires
committees supporting or opposing the qualification of an initiative to file additional
campaign statements 30 days after the initiative is titled and 21 days after a petition is
filed. This bill requires all late contribution reports filed by contributors, candidates, and
committees to include the cumulative total of all contributions made to the recipient
candidate or ballot committee. AB 3181 passed the Assembly and was reported out by
Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment.
AB J611 (Moore)

AB 3611 would require the Secretary of State to develop a program which utilizes
electronic information processing and dissemination technology to improve the availability
of campaign disclosure information. The bill requires that the Secretary of State issue a
report on the scope and cost ofthe program by July 1995. AB 3611 was passed by the
Assembly Elections, Reapportionment, and Constitutional Amendments Committee and is
currently being considered by the Assembly Ways and Means Committee.
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APPENDIX D: CAMPAIGN FINANCE IN SELECTED JURISDICTIONS

Contribution Limits

San Diego, California
San Diego has one of the most stringent contribution limit schemes in the nation. The San
Diego Municipal Election Campaign Control Ordinance was enacted in 1973. The
purpose of the ordinance is to "preserve an orderly political forum in which individuals
may express themselves effectively~ (and) to place realistic and enforceable limits on the
amounts of money that may be contributed to political campaigns in municipal
elections." 127 In order to accomplish this, candidates are allowed to accept contributions
from individuals in amounts not exceeding $250 per election cycle. Contributions from
other sources are prohibited, including from corporations, unions, political committees,
and political parties.
A recent study conducted by the San Diego Elections, Campaign and Governmental Ethics
Advisory Board evaluated the effectiveness of the city's campaign finance ordinance, and
made recommendations for further reform. The study found that while "campaign
spending in San Diego municipal elections has not historically been subject to the excess
evident in California state and federal elections,"1 28 the ordinance creates a number of
unintended consequences. Specifically, the stringent contribution limits are "badly
outdated ... fail to take into account inflation, and give wealthy candidates an unfair
advantage over the less well-funded. It disadvantages less well-known challengers with a
more limited base of donors in favor of wealthy individuals and better known
incumbents." 129 Because Buckley v. Valeo prohibits restrictions of the amount of money
candidates may contribute to their own campaigns, personal money plays a large role in
San Diego elections. 130 In order to rectify this problem, the Board recommended raising
the limits to $3 50 per election. In addition, the Board suggested prohibiting non-election
year fundraising by mayoral and city council candidates in order to encourage competition.
Expenditure Limits

West Virginia
In 1987, West Virginia enacted the first voluntary expenditure limit program not

supported by public financing. The restrictions comprise a significant portion of a Code of
Fair Campaign Practices and grew out of a failure by the state Legislature to adopt binding
statutory restrictions on campaign spending and $1,000 contribution limits. 131 Under the
current system, candidates for state and federal office may sign the Code, which includes a
127
128

Government Code Section 81002 (a).
Buckley v. Valeo 1976.

129 San Diego Municipal Code §27.2901
130 The City of San Diego Elections, Campaign,
131

and Governmental Ethics Advisory Board 1993.

Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz 1992.
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pledge to refrain from issuing slanderous or distorted campaign advertising, and which
states "I personally support a limit on campaign expenditures that, when reasonable,
sufficient, and fairly applied, does not limit or restrict the expression of ideas of the
candidate or others on behalf of the candidate, but instead challenges individuals to engage
in open dialogue on the issues rather than merely to pursue the excessive repetition of
images and slogans. Accordingly, I adhere to the following limits on campaign
spending." 132 The limits, per election, are as follows.133
U.S. Senate-------------·--··--------·------------·---·---------------$1 ,000' 000
U.S. House of Representatives
-------------------------$333,333
Governor---------------------------····--------------------$1,000,000
Other Constitutional O f f i c e r s - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $100,000
Supreme Court----------------------------------------------- $125,000
State Senate -------------------------------------------------------------------- $25,000
House of Delegates----------------------------------------------------------------------- $12,500
Circuit Judge--------------------------------------------------------------------------- $25,000
Candidates exceeding the limits are not liable for fines or legal sanctions: "if a candidate
violates the Code's limits, it allows an opposition candidate to point to that.. .. The only
sanctions are the sanctions of the news media and the opposing candidate." 134 Although
no gubernatorial candidates have agreed to limit their spending since the Code was
implemented, state officials report that spending has "dipped dramatically" in state
legislative campaigns since the Code was adopted. In its first year of operation (1988)
nearly 75 percent of successful legislative candidates abided by the self-imposed limits,
while about a third of candidates have agreed since. 135

Vermont
Vermont became the second state to pass legislation creating a system of voluntary
expenditure limits not accompanied by public financing in 1992. Under the Vermont act,
candidates are required to file a statement voluntarily accepting or declining specified
expenditure limits, and a pledge not to solicit independent expenditures on or before
August 1 for the September primary election. The limits vary depending on the office
being sought and the status of the candidates. For each of the specified levels, challengers
are allowed to spend 110 percent of the listed amounts. Gubernatorial candidates are
limited to expending no more than $400,000 combined in the primary and general
elections, while other statewide candidates are limited to spending between $40,000 and
$100,000 depending on the office. Vermont places amazingly low spending limits on
legislative candidates. State Senators are restricted to spending no more than $4,000 for
both the primary and general elections, while State Representatives from single member
districts are limited to $2,000, and Representatives from double member districts to
13 2 State of West Virginia Code of Fair Campaign Practices.
133
. For example, Senate candidates may spend $50,000 for the primary and general elections combined.
134

West Virginia Secretary of State Ken Heschler in Institute for Southern Studies, 1993.

m Institute of Southern Studies, 1993.
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$3,000. Two weeks after pledges are filed with the Secretary of State, a list of candidates
accepting limits is issued by the Secretary of State. Candidates agreeing to the limits and
then exceeding the amounts are required to remit the extra amount to the state general
fund within ninety days after the election or be fined by the Secretary of State.
The effectiveness of expenditure limits by themselves seem to be limited. Without public
subsidies or any other incentive for limiting spending, save possible public approval, most
candidates are unlikely to limit their spending. Furthermore, although the expenditure
limits are voluntary, because candidates are not offered public funds, in accordance with
Supreme Court mandates, this program might be ruled unconstitutional. 136 New
Hampshire, which has a similar program, waives high candidate filing fees and signature
requirements for candidates accepting voluntary limits in order to pass the constitutionality
test without actually distributing public funds. Lastly, the enforcement provisions of the
Vennont act are exceptionally weak. Candidates who choose initially to limit their
spending and then exceed these limits, might simply engage in fundraising after the
election to avoid a fine.
Variable Contribution Limits
Oakland, California

In 1993, Oakland adopted a unique blend of contribution limits and expenditure limits.
Finding that large contributors were having an increasingly "disproportionate or
controlling influence on the election of candidates ... (causing) the public perception that
votes are being improperly influenced by monetary contributions (and that) raising large
amounts of money distracts officeholders from important public matters, 11137 the Oakland
City Council crafted The City of Oakland Campaign Reform Act.
The measure, which will take effect for the 1994 elections, is designed to limit both
fundraising and spending for Mayor, City Council, City Auditor,.and School Board
primary and general elections without appropriating public funds. The Act contains
voluntary expenditure limits based on the current salary of city council members and the
mayor. Candidates agreeing to the expenditure limits are allowed to accept contributions
at higher levels than candidates choosing not to limit their spending.
Candidates who refuse to limit their expenditures are prohibited from receiving individual
contributions in amounts not to exceed $100 per election, and contributions more than
$250 from broad based political committees. In contrast, candidates who voluntarily
participate in the program are prohibited from accepting contributions in excess of $500
from individuals and $1,000 from broad based political committee per election. Partisan
transfers are permitted within contribution limits for all candidates. In exchange for the
ability to raise funds in larger amounts, City Council and School Board candidates must
restrict their spending to 300 percent of the salary of a city council member for the
136 See discussion of expenditure limitations and public financing, pg. 33.
137 City of Oakland Ordinance No. 11612 C.M.S. "The City of Oakland Campaign
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primary election and 250 percent for the general election (approximately $50,000 and
$42,000, respectively). City Auditor and Council Member-At-Large candidates are
limited to 500 percent of a council member's salary for the primary election and 400
percent for the general election (approximately $85,000 and $67,000, respectively) ..
Mayoral candidates are limited to 300 percent of the mayor's salary for the primary and
250 percent for the general (approximately $240,000 and $200,000, respectively).
While the Oakland Act is being implemented for the first time in the 1994 elections, there
is a chance that the measure might be ruled unconstitutional. The expenditure limits might
pass Supreme Court muster, but contribution limits appear to violate the intent of the
Buckley v. Va/eo decision, in which contribution limits are permitted only for the purpose
of preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption. The variable contribution limit
system suggests that money is corrupting at one level for certain candidates but at a higher
level for other candidates.
New Hampshire currently operates a system of variable contribution limits while
Washington voters rejected a similar plan in a 1992 campaign reform initiative. Rhode
Island and Kentucky have recently enacted laws that include expenditure limits and both
variable contribution limits and public financing in case the variable limits are ruled
unconstitutional. 138
Public Financing Without Expenditure Limits
Massachusetts
In 1975, Massachusetts implemented a system of voluntary public funding without

expenditure limits for statewide election campaigns. The program is funded through a tax
add-on system. Public participation.rates hover around 2 percent. 139 However, because
the program is available only to statewide candidates, the fund builds during the four year
cycle between elections, and adequately funds the program.
In order to qualify for the program, candidates must receive a threshold amount of money
in contributions of $250 or less. Unlike most public financing systems, candidates are
eligible to receive funds for both the primary and general elections. However, candidates
are required to raise threshold amounts for each election. Gubernatorial candidates are
required to raise $75,000 for the primary election and $125,000 for the general election to
qualify for matching funds. Levels for other statewide candidates are considerably lower.
Depending on the office and the election, candidates receiving public funds must raise
between $15,000 and $62,500 in small contributions.
The program was initially begun to ensure that spending would not be excessively
restricted after the imposition of contribution limits. Massachusetts restricts contributions
to candidates or any political committee from individuals, political action committees,
138
139

Common Cause State Issue Brief, 1993.
Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992.
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political parties, and partisan transfers. Under state law, individuals and PACs are
prohibited from contributing in excess of$1,000 per candi<late per calendar year. Political
parties are limited to $3,000 per candidate per calendar year. Partisan transfers are capped
at $100 each.
Allocation of the public campaign fund depends upon taxpayer participation in the
program and the aggregate amount raised. However, state law specifies that 60 percent of
the fund be used for the primary election and 40 percent be used for the general.
Qualifying candidates receive matching funds for contributions of $250 or less up to a
specified maximum amount. Prior to 1990, when the campaign fund was at an especially
low level, candidates did not routinely reach the maximum funding level. However, all
candidates receiving public funds in 1992 maxed out on public funds. The program
reached its maximum funding levels in 1986, when the gubernatorial candidates received a
total of$270,000 and candidates for attorney general campaign received $250,000 for the
two elections.
Comprehensive Campaign Finance Systems
Minnesota

Minnesota was the first state to adopt a comprehensive system of public financing for both
state legislative and gubernatorial candidates, in its Ethics in Government Act of 1974. In
addition to unique contribution limits, expenditure limits, and public financing, the bill
created substantial campaign and lobbying disclosure provisions, and a State Ethical
Practices Board. Due to an exceptionally high participation rate by candidates, the
Minnesota system is typically considered a model for other states. In 1992, 441 of the 457
candidate eligible for public funding accepted expenditure limits in exchange for the funds.
This 97 percent acceptance rate has actually grown from a low of 88 percent in 1988. 140
For this reason it is worthwhile to examine the Minnesota system in detail.
Contribution Limits:

•

•
•
•
140

Candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor, who run as a team, may not accept
contributions from individuals or political committees in excess of$20,000 during a
given election year, or $3,000 in all other years. They are also prohibited from
accepting contributions from political parties in excess of$100,000 during an election
year and $15,000 during a non-election year.
Candidates for Attorney General may receive up to $10,000 in an election year and
$2,000 in a non-election year from individuals and political committees, and $50,000
in an election year and $10,000 in a non-election year from political parties.
All other statewide executive candidates are limited to half the allowable limits for
Attorney General.
State Senate candidates are prohibited from accepting contributions over $1,500 in an
election year and $500 in an election year from individuals and political committees
Ibid.
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and $7,500 in an election year and $2,500 in a non-election year from political parties.
State Representative candidates are limited to half the limits for State Senate.

Voluntary Expenditure Limits:
Candidates accepting public funds in exchange for spending limits are prohibited from
spending more than the following amounts per calendar year (to be annually adjusted each
year based on the Consumer Price Index):
•
•
•
•
•

Candidates for Governor and Lieutenant Governor are limited to approximately
$1,700,000 during an election year and 25 percent ofthe expenditure limit in a nonelection year.
Candidates for Attorney General are limited to approximately $275,000 during an
election year and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year.
Other state executive office candidates (Secretary of State, Treasurer, and Auditor)
are limited to approximately $140,000 during an election year and 25 percent of the
expenditure limit in a non-election year.
State Senate candidates are limited to approximately $42,000 during an election year
and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year.
Candidates for State Representative are limited to approximately $22,000 during an
election year and 25 percent of the expenditure limit in a non-election year.

There are two exceptions to these limits. First, if a primary candidate wins a primary
election with less than twice as many votes as the second place finisher, a "close primary
rule" allows that candidate to spend a total of 125 percent of the limit during that election
year. Second, if a candidate accepting public financing is opposed by a candidate who
qualifies for public funds but does not join the program, the first candidate's expenditure
limits are lifted.

Public Financing:
Minnesota's public financing provisions are supported by a tax check-off system whereby
taxpayers can designate up to $5 to be placed in the State Elections Campaign Fund.
Contributions may be designated to either a specified political party fund or a general
candidate account. To be eligible, candidates must agree to limit their expenditures and
must raise contributions equal to 20 percent of the limit by October 1 of the election year.
Funds from the general account are dispersed to candidates in November after election
results have been certified. In addition statewide candidates must receive 5 percent of the
vote and state legislative candidates 10 percent of the vote in the general election in order
to receive public funds.
Once candidates are certified to receive funds, the general candidate account is
apportioned by the Ethical Practices Board based on the following proportions: 70 percent
of the general campaign funds are divided equally among state legislative candidates, 21
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percent among gubernatorial candidates, and 9 percent among the remaining executive
office candidates.
Funds from the political party account are dispersed in October after primary results are
certified. 10 percent of the funds in the party account are allocated directly to the state
parties as specified by taxpayer check-offs. 70 percent are allocated to the winners of
state legislative primaries depending on the amount of money checked off in the
candidates' district. This results in substantial variability between candidates across the
state. The remaining 20 percent of the funds are allocated to statewide candidates, with
gubernatorial candidates receiving 14 percent of the political party account. The twin
account system thus allows taxpayers either to designate funds for general distribution or
based on partisan identification. Distribution of money based on this system was as
follows for the 1990 election: 141
Office
Governor!Lt. Governor
Attorney General
Secretary of State
State Auditor
State Treasurer
State Senate
State Assembly

Democratic

Republican

$408,231
$69,983
$34,991
$34,991
$34,991
$716,662
$469,497

$0
$56,983
$28,491
$28,491
$28,491
$574,388
$367,736

A special report published in April 1992, "Bankrolling the Legislature" highlighted flaws in
the Minnesota campaign finance system. The report found that because "Minnesota has
never restricted how much special interest money candidates can rake in even if they
accept public financing ... special interests are pumping more and more money into
campaigns and getting results."1 42 According to the report, "special interest" contributions
have quadrupled during the sixteen year history of the program while public financing
increased by 600 percent. The report referred to a loophole in the campaign finance law
allows special interests to avoid contribution limits by contributing significant amounts to
"Friends of. ... " committees that are separate from candidate campaign committees and not
subject to regulation under state law. In addition, public financing provisions have
disproportionately benefited incumbents in politically safe districts, including 24 legislators
who were unopposed during the 1992 election. The report recommended:
•
•
•
•

Limiting the aggregate sum of PAC contributions which a candidate may collect~
Prohibiting candidates from creating numerous fundraising committees~
Banning partisan transfers; and
Encouraging contributions from small individual donors through tax breaks or a
matching funds system.

141 Ibid.
142 St. Paul Pioneer Press,
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Wisconsin
Wisconsin became the second state to institute a comprehensive campaign finance
program for state legislative candidates and statewide officials in 1978. The law is unique
because certain provisions, such as disclosure and contribution limits, apply to all state
and local elections. Further, while public funds are provided only for the general election,
expenditure limits apply to both the primary and general elections.

Contribution Limits:
•

•

•
•

Statewide candidates are prohibited from accepting contributions from individuals in
excess of$10,000; State Senate candidates are limited to $1,000; and State Assembly
candidates are limited to $500. Certain judicial candidates may accept between $1,000
and $3,000 depending on the office and local candidates are limited to $250.
Political action committees may contribute much more than individuals to statewide
candidates. The maximum PAC contribution is 4 percent of applicable expenditure
limits. Gubernatorial candidates are prohibited from receiving contributions in excess
of$43,128. Contributions to other statewide officials are capped between $8,625 and
$21,564 depending on the office. PAC contributions to legislative candidates have the
same limits as for individual contributions ($1,000 for State Senate candidates and
$500 for State Assembly candidates). Legislative candidates may not accept more
than 45 percent of the expenditure limit in PAC contributions.
While contributions from political parties are not explicitly capped at a certain level,
candidates may not accept more than 65 percent of the expenditure limits from a
combination ofPAC and partisan sources.
Corporations and labor unions are prohibited from making contributions.

Voluntary Expenditure Limits:
The following spending limits apply to both the primary and general election combined:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Gubernatorial candidates- $1,078,200.
Lieutenant Governor candidates- $323,475.
Candidates for Attorney General- $539,000.
All other statewide candidate- $215,625.
State Senate candidates- $34,500, (not to exceed $21,575 in either the primary or
general election).
State Assembly candidates- $17,250 (not to exceed $10,775 in either election).
Candidates for local and county office are restricted to specified expenditure amounts
based upon the population of their jurisdiction or district.

Public Financing:
•

In order to receive public funds for the general election, a candidate must have won
the primary election, received at least 6 percent of the total votes cast for that office in
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•

the primary election143, face an opponent, and receive at least 5-10 percent of the
expenditure limits in contributions of $100 or less depending on the office being
sought.
·
Candidates are entitled to the maximum 45 percent public funding grant only if they
have not received PAC contributions. Public funding decreases in proportion to PAC
funding.

Funds are raised through a $1 tax check-off system. Three fourths of the money raised is
appropriated to a legislative account and 25 percent is apportioned to an executive
account. However, due to a decline in tax filer designations, insufficient funds are raised
to fund all candidates to maximum grant level. Instead, all qualifying candidates may
receive up to a certain portion of the available funds. For example, in 1990, all qualifYing
State Senate candidates received up to the maximum public funding amount, while the
maximum grants for statewide officials dropped significantly (from $485,190 to $303,269
for gubernatorial candidates).l44
In 1993, the Wisconsin Legislative Council created a Special Committee on Campaign
Financing to study the effectiveness of this system and suggest possible reforms. The
Special Committee uncovered a series of significant problems and proposed a massive
restructuring of the campaign financing system.
Contribution Limits: The Committee found that limits on campaign contributions were
not sufficient to ensure "public trust in the integrity of the election process" and also
disproportionally benefited incumbents. 145 The Committee proposed to:
•
•
•

Reduce the amount that individuals and political committees may contribute by 50
percent;
Prevent the "bundling" of individual contributions; and
Eliminate fundraising by elected officeholders from the date of inauguration until the
passage of the biennial budget bill.

Expenditure Limits: The Committee found that expenditure limits were set at excessively
low levels, "inadequate to enable candidates to conduct effective campaigns in competitive
races, thereby reducing opportunities for the electorate to be informed regarding
candidates and issues."l46 Further, these expenditure limits disproportionately discriminate
against challengers. Finally, because of low limits, candidates were increasingly opting out
of the voluntary program. In 1990, just 2/3 of eligible candidates agreed to limit their
spending, and the Republican candidate for Governor became the first major party
gubernatorial candidate to refuse the program. In order to address these issues, the
Committee proposed to:

143

This provision is designed to regulate the number of minor party candidates eligible for public funds.
1992.
14S Ibid.
146Jbid.

144 Wisconsin Legislative Council,
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•
•

Raise expenditure levels significantly, to $2 million for gubernatorial candidates,
between $250,00 and $700,000 for other statewide candidates, and $80,000 and
$40,000 for Senate and Assembly candidates, respectively.
Allow challengers to spend 125 percent of the new limits while restricting incumbents
and open seat candidates to the specified amounts.

Public Funding: The Committee found that minor parties had been nearly shut out of
public funding. Further, wealthy candidates and candidates supported by independent
expenditures had a significant advantage in elections. The committee proposed:
• Eliminate the requirement that candidates receive 6 percent of the total primary vote to
become eligible for public funds.
• Allow candidates whose opponent has independent expenditures made on his or her
behalf to spend an identical amount in excess of the expenditure levels.
• Raise the tax check-off level from $1 to $3 to fully fund public financing provisions.
The Committee's recommendations were defeated by the Legislature.

Hawaii
Hawaii became the third state to provide public funding to both gubernatorial and state
legislative candidates in 1979. However, Hawaii's campaign financing system differs
dramatically from its predecessors as the strength of Hawaii's program is its contribution
limits, which encourage a reliance on state political parties.

Contribution Limits:
•
•
•

•

Contributions from individuals, corporations, labor unions, and independent
committees are limited to $2,000 per candidate per election.
Limits on political parties are much less stringent. Political parties may contribute up
to 20 percent of the spending limit for gubernatorial candidates, 30 percent to State
Senate candidates, and 40 percent to candidates for State Representative.
A constitutionally questionable provision prohibits candidates and their immediate
family members from contributing in excess of$50,000 to their political campaigns.
This appears to violate First Amendment protections as outlined by the Court in
Buckley v. Valeo.
Candidates for state legislative office and local offices (such as mayor, city council, or
local board of education) are limited to only one fundraising event that costs more
than $25 per person to attend.

Voluntary Expenditure Limits:
Candidates voluntarily accepting spending limits are restricted to spending levels based on
the number of registered voters in their district in the previous statewide general election.
Because legislative district sizes and registration levels vary, spending limits vary
substantially between state legislative candidates.
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•
•
•
•

Gubernatorial candidates are limited to spending $1.25 per registered voter.
Lieutenant Governor and State legislative candidates may spend $. 70 per registered
voter.
County Board ofEducation and other local candidates may spend only $.10 per
registered voter.
Fundraising costs are not subject to the limits.

Public Financing:
•
•
•

•

Public funds are available for both the primary and general elections.
Candidates must raise a threshold amount of money in contributions of $100 or less to
qualify for public funds. Threshold amounts vary depending on the office being sought
($1,000 for state legislative candidates to $25,000 for gubernatorial candidates).
Candidates for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, and Mayor receive public matching
funds at a 1-1 ratio up to 20 percent of the applicable spending limit. All other
qualifying candidates for elective office who agree to limit their spending are allocated
$250 for each elections.
Public funds are raised through a $2 tax check-off system. Hawaii has the highest
participation rate in the country: 30 percent of taxpayers typically designate money to
a political fund.1 47

Because Hawaii's spending limits are very restrictive and public funding levels are small,
few candidates voluntarily limit their spending. Between 1984 and 1988, just ten
candidates agreed to limit their spending out of 191 elections. After the public funding
level was increased from $50 to $250 per election in 1990, eighteen legislative candidates
participated in the program.
Seattle, Washington

Seattle was the first major municipality in the United States to adopt a comprehensive
campaign finance system in 1978. The program was in effect for the 1979 and 1981
elections, was terminated by a sunset clause in 1981, reinstated in 1984 for the 1987
election, and was superseded in 1992 by a statewide initiative. Initiative 134, which
prohibits the use of public funds for state and local elections, eliminated Seattle's authority
to implement its comprehensive system, which included partial public financing in
exchange for voluntary expenditure limits. Seattle's strict contribution limits remain in
effect, however. Thus, the 1994 elections will provide an interesting test of contribution
limits and will provide a meaningful comparison with previous elections in Seattle.
Provisions of the original comprehensive Seattle Campaign Finance Program included:

Contribution Limits:
•
147

All contributions to candidates for public office, regardless of the source, are limited to
$350 in a campaign year. Off-year contributions are prohibited.
Alexander, Goss, and Schwartz, 1992.
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Voluntary Expenditure Limits:

Candidates receiving public matching funds may not spend more than the following
amounts over a four year election cycle:
•
•

Mayoral candidates- $250,000.
All other city candidates (City Attorney, City Comptroller, City Treasurer, and the
City Council)- $110,000.

Public Financing:
•
•
•
•

Public funds are available for both the primary and general elections.
To become eligible for public financing, mayoral candidates must collect $30,000 and
other city candidates $20,000 in contributions of$100 or less.
Qualifying city candidates receive public matching funds at a 1-1 ratio ofup to $50 per
contribution.
Originally, matching funds were appropriated from the City of Seattle General Fund.
When the program was re-instituted in 1984, the ordinance was amended to allow
taxpayers to designate up to $4 of their annual tax liability to a city election fund. The
check-off appeared on the annual municipal electrical utility bill.

The City of Seattle Office of Election Administration evaluated the city's campaign finance
system in 1988. The report identifies key quantifiable objectives:
•
•
•

Encouraging small individual contributions~
Mitigating the influence of large contributors; and
Encouraging public participation in the electoral process.

The system met these objectives in closely contested city elections during the 1979 and
1981 elections, primarily by encouraging candidates to seek small contributors. The study
discovered that:
•
•
•
•

There was a substantial decrease in the average contribution size;
A decrease in the number of contributions exceeding $1 00;
A corresponding increase in the number of contributions under $1 00; and
An increase in the total number of contributors.

When the matching fund system was eliminated for the 1983 election, these trends
reversed: large contributions increased and small individual contributions returned to
previously low levels. Interestingly, when the ordinance was re-instated in 1987, many of
these trends again reversed: the proportion oflarger contributions decreased, and the
average size of contributions decreased. The study concludes from this data that Seattle's
public financing system largely met its stated objectives.l 48
148

Miller, 1988.
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Los Angeles, California

The Los Angeles City Council approved City Charter Section 312 in 1985. The measure
limits large contributions in city elections. Since that time, campaign finance provisions
have been gradually added by city council and citizen-sponsored initiatives, creating the
most comprehensive campaign financing system in California. In June of 1990, voters
passed Measure H, which created the Los Angeles Ethics Commission, established
considerable ethics regulations, provided a substantial salary increase for local officials,
and instituted public financing for local elections. The stated purpose of the measure was
to reduce campaign spending, decrease the influence of special interests, and increase
competition in city elections. The measure was immediately challenged in court as a
violation of Proposition 73's ban on public funding of California elections. The California
Supreme Court upheld its validity in 1992, allowing it to take effect. The Court ruled that
the California Constitution gives charter cities the right to legislate municipal affairs:
"Proposition 73's prohibition on public financing does not preclude the City of Los
Angeles from adopting and enforcing the public funding provisions of its campaign reform
measure."l 5 Counties do not have similar independent authority, however. The Court
previously invalidated Sacramento County's public financing ordinance on the grounds that
state law prevails over a conflicting county law in matters in which authority is not
specifically delegated to counties in the California Constitution. 1S 1 The provisions of Los
Angeles' campaign finance system are as follows:

°

Contribution Limits:

•
•

•

•
•

Limited all contributions to candidates for citywide elected office to $1,000 per
election. Contributions to City Council candidates are capped at $250 per election.
Restricted candidates in the aggregate amount of money they may raise from nonindividuals (PACs, political parties, labor unions, and corporations). Mayoral
candidates may not accept more than $900,000, while other citywide officials are
limited to 400,000, and City Council candidates are limited to $150,000. (If the
Matching Funds Trust Fund does not contain enough money to fully subsidize all of
the qualifYing candidates up to the maximum level, this provision is discarded.)
Permits citywide candidates to raise funds only during a period beginning twenty-four
months prior to an election and ending three months after that election. City Council
candidates may only receive contributions eighteen months prior to and three months
after an election.
Permits candidates to transfer campaign funds to political parties, ballot measure
committees, and non-city candidates, but may not transfer contributions to other
candidates for Los Angeles elected office.
If a candidate participating in the matching funds program is opposed by an opponent
who contributes in excess of $30,000 of personal funds to his or her campaign, the
participating candidate may raise the identical amount in contributions not subject to
the above limits.

ISO Ross Johnson v. Tom Bradley, 1992.
lSI County ofSacramento v. Fair Political Practices
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Voluntary Expenditure Limits:
Candidates who voluntarily accept spending limits in exchange for matching public funds
are restricted to the following spending levels:
•
•
•
•
•

Mayoral candidates- $2 million for a primary election and $1.6 million for a run-off
election.
Candidates for other citywide offices- between $800,000 and $900,000 for a primary
election and $600,000 and $700,000 for a run-off election, depending on the office.
City Council candidates- $300,000 for a primary and $250,000 for a run-off election.
The costs of complying with campaign finance provisions, such as bookkeeping, legal
services, and accounting, may reach up to 20 percent of the expenditure ceilings
without counting toward total expenditures.
If a candidate refuses to participate and spends more than the applicable spending
limits, or benefits from large independent expenditures,- the opposing candidate may
receive public funds without following spending limits.

Public Financing:
•
•

•
•
•
•

•

•

Public funds are available to qualifying candidates for both the primary and run-off
elections.
To qualify, citywide candidates must raise a threshold amount of money in
contributions of $500 or less. City Council candidates must raise a threshold amount
in contributions of$250 or less. Threshold amounts vary from $150,000 for mayoral
candidates to $25,000 for City Council candidates.
To qualify, a candidate must be opposed by a candidate who qualifies for the program
or has raised a specified amount of money.
To qualify, a candidate must agree not to spend more than a specified amount of
personal funds on their own campaign. The limit is $100,000 for mayoral candidates
and $25,00o for City Council candidates.
To qualify, a candidate must agree to hold at least one scheduled debate with their
opponent prior to the primary election and two debates prior to the general election.
Matching public funds are available to qualifying citywide candidates on a 1-1 ratio for
each individual contribution of $500 or less raised within one year prior to the
election. City Council candidates may receive matching funds for individual
contributions up to $250.
The amount of public funding a candidate may receive depends on the office being
sought. Candidates for mayor may receive up to $667,000 for the primary and
$800,00 for the run-off election, while City Council candidates may receive a
maximum of$100,000 in the primary election and $125,000 in the run-off.
$2 million from the Los Angeles City General Fund is appropriated annually to a
Matching Funds Trust Fund to finance this matching funds program.

Los Angeles has only held one citywide election under Measure Hs provisions. Of the
119 candidates on the April 1993 primary ballot, only 28 received matching funds (totaling
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$3.3 million.) Of the ten candidates in run-off elections, nine received matching funds
(totaling $1.4 million.) Participation was clearly better in the run-off election. Still,
Benjamin Bycel, Executive Director of the Los Angeles Ethics Commission, concluded
that "the program increased the ability of challengers to compete."1 52 While incumbents
outspent their challengers by a 10 to 1 margin in 1989, and a 20 to 1 margin in 1991,
incumbents outspent their challengers by just 3 to I in 1993 (under Measure H). More
importantly, average spending by challengers increased dramatically from approximately
$15,000 in 1991 to nearly $70,000 in 1993. Qualifying primary candidates received at
least 48 percent of their campaign funds from small individual contributors. When
combined with public grants, these candidates received an average of 64 percent of their
funds from those contributors or the city of Los Angeles. 1.S3

Aggregate campaign spending increased during the 1993 election cycle. This appears to
be the result of the increased number of serious challengers, because average spending by
incumbents decreased. The central challenge facing administrators of the Los Angeles
campaign finance law is to encourage more candidates to participate in the program.
New York, New York

The New York City Council approved the Campaign Finance Act of 1988 to reduce "the
influence of wealthy contributors on electoral campaigns and address the public perception
that large contributions to candidates purchased special access to elected officials and
purchased special privilege in the conduct of official business." 154 The ambitious Act also
sought to increase participation by candidates and voters in more competitive elections.
To accomplish these objectives, the City Council adopted a multifaceted approach to
election reform. The reforms included:
•

•

•

A Campaign Finance Board responsible for administering and enforcing the campaign
regulations and producing and distributing a non-partisan voter guide to all registered
voters in the city. The guide, which is printed in numerous languages, has been hailed
as a national voter education model.
An entirely voluntary comprehensive financing system. While most jurisdictions with
comprehensive systems have voluntary expenditure limits in exchange for public
funding, all aspects of the New York City system are voluntarily accepted in exchange
for public funding. Candidates not accepting public money, are subject to much less
stringent state laws governing contribution limits and disclosure.
Disclosure provisions include a computerized Campaign Finance Information System
that compiles detailed information from candidates' disclosure reports in an easily
accessible format.

The Act was amended in 1992, and now contains a blend of voluntary contribution limits,
expenditure limits, and partial public funding for city elections.
152 Benjamin Bycel testimony, Senate Committee on Elections and Reapportionment. October 28, 1993.
1S3

City ofLos Angeles Ethic Commission. 1994.

154 New York City Campaign Finance Board "Dollars and Disclosure", 1990.

CRB-IS-006

July 1994

Page D16

Contribution Limits:
•

•

All participating candidates for citywide elected office are prohibited from soliciting or
accepting contributions in excess of $6,500 for the primary and general election
combined. Contributions to participating candidates for Borough President are limited
to $5,000, while contributions to participating City Council candidates are capped at
$3,000 per campaign cycle.
Non-participating candidates may not accept contributions in excess of the levels
permitted by state law: $100,000 per election cycle for citywide candidates and $7,900
for City Council candidates.

Voluntary Expenditure Limits:
Candidates voluntarily accepting spending limits in exchange for matching funds are
restricted to the following spending levels:
•
•
•
•

Mayoral candidates- $4 million on the primary election and $4 million on the general
election.
Candidates for Comptroller and Public Advocate- $2.5 million on each of the primary
and general elections.
Candidates for Borough President- $900,000 for each election
City Council candidates- $105,000 for each election.

Public Financing:
To qualify for public funds, candidates must agree to abide by the contribution and
expenditure limits, be opposed on the ballot, file extensive disclosure statements, and meet
the following threshold levels:
•
•
•
•
•

Mayoral candidates must collect $250,000 in contributions from 1,000 New York City
residents;
Comptroller and Public Advocate candidates must receive $125,000 in contributions
from 500 city residents;
Candidates for Borough President must raise between $10,000 and $50,000,
depending on census figures, from 100 borough residents.
City Council candidates must raise $5,000 from 50 contributions residing within their
district.
All threshold contributions are subject to the contribution limits.

Qualifying candidates receive matching funds on a 1-1 ratio for each individual
contribution of $1,000 or less. Candidates facing a high spending non-participant receive
matching funds at a rate of 2 to 1. City Council candidates may receive a maximum of
$40,000 per election (38 percent of the applicable spending limit). All other candidates
are limited to a maximum of half of the applicable spending limit from public sources.
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Following the 1989 elections, the New York Campaign Finance Program received a great
deal of praise. The New York Times called the program "An Electoral Example for the
Country," 155 and numerous candidates, both winners and losers, credited the program with
enabling them to run competitive campaigns based on community fundraising. Citywide
elections were reportedly, "the most competitive in decades"l 56 due to more equitable
campaign spending levels. However, only half of the incumbents seeking re-election to the
City Council agreed to participate in the program in 1989.
The Campaign Finance Board subsequently offered a number of amendments to the
program to facilitate its use in City Council races, including increasing public grants.
While only 34 percent of Council candidates participated in 1989, approximately 57
percent participated in 1991, and 86 percent of primary election candidates participated in
1993 as well as 56 percent of general election candidates. Electoral competition has also
been enhanced. In 1989, only one third of City Council incumbents faced primary election
challengers. This figure increased to one half in 1991. Further, the contested elections
resulted in closer vote margins. The New York City Campaign Finance Board found that
the margin of votes was five percent closer between incumbents and participating
challengers than incumbents and non-participating challengers in the primary election and
11 percent closer in the general election. During the 1993 election, the Board reports that
78 percent of the victorious candidates participated in the comprehensive financing
program. 157
Public financing also had a dramatic effect on the source of campaign funds. In 1993,
participants raised 53 percent of their funds from individuals and received an additional 17
percent of their total funds in public matching funds. Corporations, political action
committees, and other political committees accounted for less than 30 percent of the total
sum raised by participating candidates. 158 The Campaign Finance Board has proposed
adjusting the program to further limit the role of wealthy contributors and special interests,
including lowering contribution limits from $6,500 to $5,000 for citywide candidates.
The central challenge facing the New York City program is to encourage greater
participation in the voluntary program. While citywide candidates have consistently joined
the program, partly to receive financial benefits and partly to appease the news media, City
Council candidates have had low rates of participation. The Board has proposed a series
of amendments to further enhance candidates participation, including lowering threshold
levels, increasing spending limits by nearly 25 percent, and increasing the penalties nonparticipation by providing greater benefits, such as 3 to 1 matching funds, to their
participating opponents.

m Ibid.
1S6
157

Ibid.

New York City Campaign Finance Board "Campaign Finance Program", 1993.

ISS Ibid.
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APPENDIX E: ADJUSTED CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE CAMPAIGN
EXPENDITURES 1980-1992

Amount Spent by State Legislative Candidates
Adjusted for Inflation, Per Capita 1980-1992

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

Amount Spent by State Legislative Candidates
Adjusted for Inflation, Per Registered Voter 1980-1992

1980
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APPENDIX F: CAMPAIGN RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES: CALIFORNIA
LEGISLATURE 1976-1992
1992 General Election
Receipts
$31 million (total for all candidates)
$4.17 million Senate
$26.01 million Assembly

Expenditures
$34 million (total for all candidates)
Exact figures not available
Exact figures not available

1992 Primary Election
Receipts
$42 million (total for all candidates)
$9.77 million Senate
$32.04 million Assembly

Expenditures
$38 million (total for all candidates)
Exact figures not available
Exact figures not available

1990 General Election
Receipts
$56 million (total for all candidates)
$4.51 million Senate
$12.71 million Assembly
$38.32 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$70 million (total for all candidates)
$7.05 million Senate
$16.90 million Assembly
$46.40 million Constitutional

1990 Primary Election
Receipts
$81 million (total for all candidates)
$7.96 million Senate
$26.81 million Assembly
$46.29 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$72 million (total for all candidates)
$6.45 million Senate
$24.07 million Assembly
$41.07 million Constitutional

1988 General Election
Receipts
$33 million (total for all candidates)
$8.38 million Senate
$24.71 million Assembly

Expenditures
$40 million (total for all candidates)
$9.88 million Senate
$30.33 million Assembly

1988 Primary Election
Receipts
$43 million (total for all candidates)
$12.18 million Senate
$31.32 million Assembly
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$36 million (total for all candidates)
$10.38 million Senate
$25.54 million Assembly
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1986 General Election
Receipts
$47 million (total for all candidates)
$10.48 million Senate
$15.14 million Assembly
$21.03 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$59 million (total for all candidates)
$12.10 million Senate
$18.32 million Assembly
$28.19 million Constitutional

1986 Primary Election
Receipts
$59 million (total for all candidates)
$8.38 million Senate
$22.66 million Assembly
$27.86 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$47 million (total for all candidates)
$6.45 million Senate
$20.10 million Assembly
, $20.81 million Constitutional

1984 General Election
Receipts
$22 million (total for all candidates)
$7.29 million Senate
$14.73 million Assembly

Expenditures
$24 million (total for all candidates)
$8.04 million Senate
$16.22 million Assembly

1984 Primary Election
Receipts
$28 million (total for all candidates)
$7.76 million Senate
$19.84 million Assembly

Expenditures
$21 million (total for all candidates)
$6.03 million Senate
$14.53 million Assembly

1982 General Election
Receipts
$40 million (total for all candidates)
$6.24 million Senate
$15.79 million Assembly
$18.22 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$43 million (total for all candidates))
$6.92 million Senate
$17.38 million Assembly
$18.64 million Constitutional

1982 Primary Election
Receipts
$45 million (total for all candidates)
$5.99 million Senate
$17.7 5 million Assembly
$22.39 million Constitutional
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$21.88 million Constitutional
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1980 General Election
Receipts
$17 million (total for all candidates)
$3.79 million Senate
$12.86 million Assembly

Expenditures
$18 million (total for all candidates)
$3.88 million Senate
$13.72 million Assembly

1980 Primary Election
Receipts
$19 million (total for all candidates)
$4.32 million Senate
$14.72 million Assembly

Expenditures
$17 million (total for all candidates)
$3.61 million Senate
$13.13 million Assembly

1978 General Election
Receipts
$21 million (total for all candidates)
$3.09 million Senate
$7.07 million Assembly
$11.22 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$22 million (total for all candidates)
$3 .13 million Senate
$7.49 million Assembly
$11.10 million Constitutional

1978 Primary Election
Receipts
$24 million (total for all candidates)
$2.75 million Senate
$8.45 million Assembly
$12.56 million Constitutional

Expenditures
$22 million (total for all candidates)
$2.32 million Senate
$7.34 million Assembly
$12.41 million Constitutional

1976 General Election
Receipts
$7 million (total for all candidates)
$2.29 million Senate
$5.07 million Assembly

Expenditures
$8 million (total for all candidates)
$2.59 million Senate
$5.10 million Assembly

1976 Primary Election
Receipts
$9 million (total for all candidates)
$2.58 million Senate
$5.98 million Assembly
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APPENDIX G: CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS:
California Legislature 1991-1992

TOTAL LEGISLATURE
Individuals
PACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

AMOUNT
$79,890,679
$13,976,490
$48,047,943
$12,362,483
$5,503,763

NUMBER
81,108
42,431
37,565
873
238

AVERAGE
$984
$329
$1,279
$14,161
$23,125

NON-INCUMBENTS (251)
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

$25,793,034
$5,851,106
$9,722,506
$5,961,380
$4,258,042

30,066
20,217
9,130
510
209

$858
$289
$1,065
$11,689
$20,373

INCUMBENTS (82)
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

$54,097,645
$8,125,384
$38,325,437
$6,401,103
$1,245,721

51,042
22,214
28,436
363
29

$1,060
$366
$1,348
$17,634
$42,956

INDIVIDUAL MONEY
Incumbents (82)
Non-Incumbents (251)

$13,976,490
$8,125,384
$5,851,106

42,348
20,217
22,214

$330
$366
$289

PAC MONEY
Incumbents (82)
Non-Incumbents (251)

$48,047,943
$38,325,437
$9,722,506

37,565
28,436
9,130

$1,279
$1,348
$1,065

PARTY MONEY
Incumbents (82)
Non-Incumbents (251)

$12,362,483
$6,401,103
$5,961,380

873
363
510

$14,161
$17,634
$11,689

FAMILY MONEY
Incumbents (82)
Non-Incumbents (251)

$5,503,763
$1,245,721
$4,258,042

238
29
209

$23,125
$42,956
$20,373
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California State Senate 1991-1992

TOTAL SENATE
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

Amount
$22,884,746
$3,628,953
$14,980,282
$2,361,896
$1,913,615

Number
21,483
9,781
11,534
139
29

Average
$1,065
$371
$1,299
$16,992
$65,987

Median
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

NON-INCUMBENTS (25)
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

$2,542,688
$595,673
$527,335
$380,240
$1,039,440

2,180
1,695
438
24
23

$1,166
$351
$1,204
$15,843
$45,193

$125
$500
$1,025
$3,025

INCUMBENTS (23)
Individuals
PACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers
Family

$20,342,058
$3,033,280
$14,452,947
$1,981,656
$874,175

19,303
8,086
11,096
115
6

$1,034
$375
$1,303
$17,232
$145,696

$200
$600
$5,000
$28,500

INDIVIDUAL MONEY
Incumbents (23)
Non-Incumbents (25)

$3,628,953
$3,033,280
$595,673

9,781
8,086
1,695

$371
$375
$351

$200
$125

PAC MONEY
Incumbents (23)
Non-Incumbents (25)

$14,980,282
$14,452,947
$527,335

11,534
ll,096
438

$1,299
$1,303
$1,204

$600
$500

139
115
24

$16,992
$17,232
$15,843

$5,000
$1,025

29
6
23

$65,987
$145,696
$45,193

$28,500
$3,025

PARTY MONEY
Incumbents (23)
Non-Incumbents (25)

$2,361,896
$1,981,656
. $380,240

FAMILY MONEY
Incumbents (23)
Non-Incumbents (25)

$1,913,615
$874,175
$1,039,440
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California State Assembly 1991-1992
Amount
$57,005,933
$10,347,537
$33,067,661
$10,000,587
$3,590,148

Number
59,625
32,650
26,032
734
209

Average
$956
$317
$1,270
$13,625
$17,178

Median
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

$23,250,346
$5,255,433
$9,195,171
$5,581,140
$3,218,602

27,886
18,522
8,692
486
186

$833
$284
$1,058
$11,484
$17,304

$150
$500
$1,223
$5,804

Family

$33,755,587
$5,092,104
$23,872,490
$4,419,447
$371,546

31,739
14,128
17,340
248
23

$1,063
$360
$1,377
$17,820
$16,154

$200
$500
$3,000
$2,730

INDIVIDUAL MONEY
Incumbents (59)
Non-Incumbents (226)

$10,347,537
$5,092,104
$5,255,433

32,650
14,128
18,522

$317
$360
$284

$200
$150

PAC MONEY
Incumbents (59)
Non-Incumbents (226)

$33,067,661
$23,872,490
$9,195,171

26,032
17,340
8,692

$1,270
$1,377
$1,058

$500
$500

PARTY MONEY
Incumbents (59)
Non-Incumbents (226)

$10,000,587
$4,419,447
$5,581,140

734
248
486

$13,625
$17,820
$11,484

$3,000
$1,223

FAMll..Y MONEY

$3,590,148
$371,546
$3,218,602

209
23
186

$17,178
$16,154
$17,304

$2,730
$5,804

TOTAL ASSEMBLY
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers

Family
NON-INCUMBENTS (226)
Individuals
PACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers

Family
INCUMBENTS (59)
Individuals
P ACs, Business, and Labor
Party and Transfers

Incumbents (59)
Non-Incumbents (226)
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